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FORGOTTEN  FEDERAL-MISSIONARY
PARTNERSHIPS:  NEW  LIGHT  ON  THE
ESTABLISHMENT  CLAUSE
Nathan S. Chapman*
Americans have long debated whether the Establishment Clause permits the government to
support education that includes religious instruction.  Current doctrine permits states to do so by
providing vouchers for private schools on a religiously neutral basis.  Unlike most Establishment
Clause doctrines, however, the Supreme Court did not build this one on a historical foundation.
Rather, in cases from Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue (2020), opponents of religious-school funding have claimed Ameri-
can history supports a strict rule of no-aid.
Yet the Court and scholars have largely ignored a practice that casts light on the historical
understanding of the Establishment Clause: from the Revolution through the Civil War, the
federal government partnered with missionaries to educate Native American students.  At first ad
hoc, the practice became a full-scale program with the Civilization Fund Act of 1819.  Presidents
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe all actively participated.  Intriguingly, no one
objected to the partnerships on constitutional grounds.  This is the first Article to place this
practice in its cultural, political, and constitutional context, to consider its implications for the
intellectual and political history of disestablishment, and to wrestle with its potential implications
for contemporary church-state doctrine.
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[Samuel Worcester] entered the aforesaid Cherokee nation in the capacity of a duly
authorised missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions,
under the authority of the president of the United States . . . .1
INTRODUCTION
Generations of constitutional scholars have studied Worcester v. Georgia as
a landmark decision about the relative power of the federal and state govern-
ments over relations with the Native American nations.2  But they have
largely overlooked the federal-missionary partnership that gave rise to the
case: Worcester was a clergy member authorized by the federal government
to educate Cherokee students within the state of Georgia.3  This oversight is
somewhat understandable—the partnerships were a relatively small compo-
nent of federal–Native American relations during the early republic.  Moreo-
ver, at the time, they raised no constitutional objections.  Yet for this reason
they present a puzzle for the history of the separation of church and state:
Why did a federal program that paid ministers to educate Native American
students raise no objections from officials such as James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, officials who had objected so vehemently to a Virginia bill
to fund churches and clergy salaries, and who had insisted on a strict applica-
tion of the federal Establishment Clause?4
The answer, this Article argues, is that Americans throughout the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries understood education to entail at least
a modicum of religious instruction.5  They tacitly distinguished between the
governmental funding of such education and the funding of churches for
purposes of separation of church and state.6  This account dramatically
revises the standard narrative of religious disestablishment that the Supreme
1 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 538 (1832).
2 See generally JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: TWO LANDMARK FEDERAL DECISIONS
IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); see also GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 42–47 (2007); G. Edward
White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35, in 3–4 THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 730–40, (1988).
3 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 538.
4 See infra Parts III & IV.
5 See infra Part V.
6 See infra Part VI.
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Court has relied upon in school funding cases since Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion (1947),7 a narrative repeated yet again by the dissenting Justices last term
in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.8  In response, the Court merely
ventured that “[i]t is far from clear” that the objections to “special support
for certain churches and clergy” “extend[ed] to programs that provide equal
support to all private primary and secondary schools.”9  The Court could
have gone further: virtually every federal official in the early republic, includ-
ing James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, used federal funds to directly sup-
port schools run by religious groups.
This Article provides the first thorough analysis of the federal-missionary
partnerships in their political, religious, and constitutional contexts, from
the Revolution through the antebellum period.  Originally, the partnerships
were ad hoc.  Presidents paid a trusted clergy member to serve as an ex-
officio agent, spy, mediator, or educator.  The partnerships turned into a full-
blown federal program, however, with the Civilization Fund Act of 1819,
which allocated $10,000 per year to fund instructors of “good moral charac-
ter” to “introduc[e] among [the Native Americans] the habits and arts of
civilization.”10  For the next fifty years, virtually all of the recipients of these
funds were Christian denominations or missionaries ordained by them.11  To
varying degrees, the missionaries instructed the students in Christian moral-
ity and doctrine.  With one possible exception, no one contested the pro-
gram’s constitutionality.12  Among the officers who actively participated, and
raised no objections, were Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Richard
Mentor Johnson—a “who’s who” of the disestablishment vanguard.13
So far, only a handful of scholars have studied the government-mission-
ary partnerships.14  Historians of federal–Native American relations have
7 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—
and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 140 (2017).
8 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2284–86 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 22–23, 57, 59, Espinoza, 139 S. Ct. 2246 (No. 18-1195) (Sotomayor, J., making
the same point).
9 Espinoza, 140 S.Ct. at 2258 n.3.
10 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, § 1, 3 Stat. 516, 516–17 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 271
(2018)); see infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part III.
14 This is in spite of the vastness of the literature on the history of disestablishment.
DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 156–94 (2010) (providing a
historiography of scholarship); Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of History:
The Supreme Court, Lessons of History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in EVERSON REVIS-
ITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23 (Jo Renée Formicola &
Hubert Morken eds., 1997) (counting over one hundred articles and monographs on the
historical support for Everson); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1387 (noting religion clause
scholars write “a hefty monograph at a rate of about one every other year”).
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largely ignored the disestablishment questions they raise.15  Constitutional
scholars, for their part, have drawn opposite inferences from the partner-
ships.16  Douglas Laycock, for instance, has argued that the partnerships
“suggest[ ] . . . that the Founders were not concerned about money that went
to churches in pursuit of secular goals.”17  By contrast, Donald Drakeman, in
the most thorough constitutional analysis of the partnerships to date, has
argued that, if the partnerships do not violate the Establishment Clause, “it is
hard to imagine what could possibly link church and state closely enough” to
do so.18  Yet no one has studied the details of the partnerships within their
social, political, and constitutional setting, nor grappled with the question
they raise about the development of nonestablishment norms: How could so
many officials have objected to using tax dollars to fund churches and clergy
without raising a constitutional eyebrow over the federal-missionary
partnerships?
This Article attempts to answer this question by evaluating original his-
torical research about the partnerships in light of scholarship on the history
of federal–Native American relations, disestablishment, political theology,
secularization, Christianity and race, and legal borderlands.  While U.S. offi-
cials likely assumed the constitutionality of the government-missionary part-
nerships for overlapping reasons, including untheorized assumptions about
the territorial and personal limits of the Establishment Clause, the historical
evidence most directly supports the conclusion that elite white Americans
shared a “social imaginary”—or social paradigm—of “civilization” that
merged education, republicanism, and Christianity.19  The vast majority of
formal elementary education during the early republic entailed basic instruc-
tion in Christian morality, if not Christian doctrine.  In this respect, the fed-
eral partnerships were no different than schools funded by states, local
governments, and the District of Columbia.20
15 See, e.g., R. PIERCE BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1966); 1
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 135–36 (1984); see also MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND
CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2013); Theodore Fischbacher, A Study
of the Role of the Federal Government in the Education of the American Indian (May
1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with author); Martha Elizabeth
Layman, A History of Indian Education in the United States (1942) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota).
16 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 60–81 (1982) (reproducing government documents with little analysis);
J.M. O’NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 118–19 (1949); Lay-
cock, supra note 7, at 144.
17 Laycock, supra note 7, at 144.
18 DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 335; see also VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS,
TRIBES, TREATIES, & CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 99–107 (1999).
19 See CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 146 (2007) (defining “social imaginary” as “the
way we collectively imagine, even pretheoretically, our social life”); see also id. at 171–72
(expounding).
20 See infra Part V.
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The Article’s main contribution is to the historical development of
nonestablishment norms.  A number of judges and scholars have suggested
that religious assessments—taxes for churches and clergy—are the paradig-
matic example of what the Framers and ratifying public understood the
Establishment Clause to forbid.21  By implication the Constitution forbids a
broad range of “support [for] an institution which teaches the tenets and
faith of any church.”22  Since Everson, then, the Court has proceeded from
this premise; the only question has been how broadly to define that range.23
The federal government’s direct support for mission schools suggests that
U.S. officials, from the Founding through the antebellum period, operated
with a relatively narrow conception of the anti-assessment principle, limited
to government-forced tithes (regular payments for the operation of parish
churches).  Madison’s well-known objections to the Virginia assessments were
rhetorically broad—more than capacious enough to justify strict separa-
tion.24  Yet apparently few officials, including Madison, believed that nonest-
ablishment entirely foreclosed financial support for religious instruction that
was incidental to a general education.25
The Article also wrestles with this history’s implications for American
constitutionalism today.  Any line from the federal-missionary partnerships to
contemporary doctrine must be qualified and tentative.  The partnerships
were a tool of the federal government’s policy of assimilating Native Ameri-
cans into white American political culture.26  Though carried out against a
backdrop of “violent expropriation of the western borderlands from Indi-
ans,”27 white officials, missionaries, and some Native American leaders
believed the mission schools were a benevolent (and relatively inexpensive)
alternative to war.28  As a formal matter, the schools were voluntary,29 just as
the tribes were, as a matter of law and theory, independent (yet uniquely
21 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2033–34 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947);
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 418
(2002) (concluding that “the broadly shared eighteenth-century view” was “that it was
wrong to coerce payment of taxes for religious purposes against conscience”); Andrew
Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 745–46
(2009) (considering assessments the “paradigm case” of establishment violation); Douglas
Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 875, 895 (1986) (“[T]he debates in Virginia [on the assessment bill] [are the] most
important” evidence of “how the concept of establishment was understood in the Framers’
generation.”).
22 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
23 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 140.
24 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 295–306 (Robert A. Rutland &
William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 622–23 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
25 See infra Part III.
26 See infra Parts I & II.
27 Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1008 (2014).
28 See infra Section II.A.
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“dependent”) nations capable of exercising sovereign authority to enter into
treaties with the United States.30  Even at the time, however, astute observers
recognized the Native nations’ independence was all too often compromised
by the threat, actual or tacit, of federal, state, and private force.31  These
imbalances of power surely reduced the voluntariness of the consent of at
least some Native families who participated in the mission schools.
And there is no doubt that the federal-missionary partnerships were
predicated on political, cultural, and religious chauvinism, in some respects
sounding in racism.32  The government’s purpose was to eliminate the
aspects of Native American culture that white officials believed to be incom-
patible with full participation in a democratic republic.33  In these respects,
at least, the program was the product of a political culture foreign to our
own, anathema to a constitutional regime that “aim[s] to foster a society in
which people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously.”34
Another challenge facing contemporary jurists is that the officials who
created and implemented the partnerships did not opine on their constitu-
tionality.  As a result, the practice arguably did not generate a constitutional
norm that may be readily “translated”35 into a doctrinal principle.36  In the
language of James Madison, picked up by contemporary originalist theorists,
the partnerships generated no debate or reason-giving that might amount to
29 See infra Section III.B.  This distinguishes the antebellum programs from post–Civil
War federal policies restricting Native American religious practices and forcing Native
American students into boarding schools. See DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR
EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 (1995);
TISA WENGER, WE HAVE A RELIGION: THE 1920S PUEBLO INDIAN DANCE CONTROVERSY AND
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 7 (2009); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The
Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free
Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 787–805 (1997).
30 See generally Gregory Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty: Native Nationhood, the United
States, and International Law, 1783–1795, 106 J. AM. HIST. 591 (2019).
31 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 528 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.
Schleifer, trans., Liberty Fund 2010) (1835) (“Half persuaded, half forced, the Indians
move away; they go to inhabit new wildernesses where whites will not leave them in peace
for even ten years.”); see id. at 547 (“[T]he Americans of the United States have achieved
this double result [exterminating the Indian race and preventing it from sharing their
rights] with a marvelous ease, calmly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood,
without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world.
You cannot destroy men while better respecting the laws of humanity.” (footnote
omitted)).
32 See, e.g., Derek Chang, “Marked in Body, Mind, and Spirit”: Home Missionaries and the
Remaking of Race and Nation, in RACE, NATION, AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAS 135 (Henry
Goldschmidt & Elizabeth McAlister eds., 2004); WENGER, supra note 29, at 12.
33 See infra Section II.A.
34 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
35 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
36 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359,
362 (1988). But see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1123, 1124–25 (2020) (arguing that longstanding practice is uniquely
normative for constitutional law).
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a “liquidation” of the meaning of the Establishment Clause.37  What the part-
nerships offer instead is clarity on the breadth of the historical objection to
religious assessments.  But that clarity admittedly depends on the reason offi-
cials took the constitutionality of the partnerships for granted—a reason that
must be inferred from the entire context of the practice.
Nevertheless, the Article argues that, translated for a constitutional
regime committed to governmental religious neutrality, the partnerships
have important implications for ongoing constitutional disputes.  In particu-
lar, the history supports the current doctrinal principle that the government
may provide funds to religious institutions for a nonreligious purpose, so
long as it distributes the funds on a religiously neutral basis and according to
private choice.38  The partnerships also have implications for taxpayer stand-
ing, the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” funding, and the funding
of religious education for foreign clerics.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Parts I and II narrate the government’s
partnership with missionaries to educate Native Americans from the colonial
era through the Civil War.  Much of the evidence is new to the literature on
the history of religious disestablishment.  Parts III to V address the puzzle of
why American officials who opposed religious assessments could support the
missionary partnerships.  Part VI discusses the implications of the partner-
ships for the historical development of nonestablishment norms, and Part VII
discusses their implications for contemporary constitutional doctrine.
I. THE WASHINGTON POLICY: “THE INSTRUMENTS TO WORK ON THE INDIANS”
The federal government inherited and transformed a colonial legacy of
government-missionary partnerships to evangelize and pacify Native peoples.
The Washington administration continued the government’s practice during
the Revolution to employ missionaries as spies, liaisons, and educators.
Whereas the colonial partnerships were shaped by colonial religious estab-
lishments, the early federal partnerships manifested no religious preference.
The Jefferson administration continued the Washington policy, and in the
wake of the War of 1812, the Madison and Monroe administrations increased
the government’s partnerships with mission efforts, leading to the Civiliza-
tion Fund Act of 1819.
A. The Colonial and Revolutionary Legacy
Throughout the colonial era, the Church of England was the religion
“by law established” in England, but the Crown permitted the North Ameri-
can colonies to maintain various competing Protestant establishments.
37 See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–20 (2019);
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–21
(2001).
38 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019
(2017); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
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According to colonial charters,39 corporate declarations,40 and sermons41
from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, one of the official pur-
poses of English colonization was to convert Native Americans to Protestant-
ism.  Nevertheless, most of the colonies did little to directly support Christian
evangelization.  This is unsurprising: the “distinguishing feature” of
Anglo–Native American relations “was replacement of the Indians on the
land by white settlers.”42  English colonists usually negotiated formal land
exchanges by treaty,43 but constant encroachment on tribal lands by white
settlers led to nearly two centuries of warfare, reprisals, fear, and distrust.44
Yet two colonial mission efforts served as models for early federal-mis-
sionary partnerships.  The first effort was the well-known missions of Thomas
Mayhew and John Eliot in mid-seventeenth century Puritan Massachusetts.
Mayhew, the self-appointed governor of Martha’s Vineyard, received minor
support from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England
(also known as the New England Company).  Many Wampanoags converted
and became missionaries to others on Nantucket and the mainland.45  John
Eliot, the minister at Roxbury, received funds and land from the Massachu-
setts General Court and the New England Company to establish large towns
of “Praying Indians.”46  The Mayhew and Eliot partnerships inspired Congre-
gational missionaries into the nineteenth century.47
The other colonial episode foreshadowed the mixed religious and politi-
cal motives of the early federal partnerships.  When the Iroquois nations
became British subjects after Queen Anne’s War, the Queen directed the
39 See FIRST CHARTER OF VIRGINIA, (1606), reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CON-
STITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3783, 3784
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); THE SECOND CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (1609), reprinted in
7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, supra, at 3790, 3802.
40 See T. RUNDLE, A SERMON PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S CHURCH HANOVER SQUARE, ON
SUNDAY FEBRUARY 17, 1733/4, at 21 (1733/4).
41 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 23–24.
42 PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 11.
43 Id. at 16.
44 See id. at 13; see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE BARBAROUS YEARS 498 (2012); PETER SIL-
VER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA, at xviii
(2008).
45 See BEAVER, supra note 15, at 34–35; DAVID J. SILVERMAN, FAITH AND BOUNDARIES 51
(2005); David J. Silverman, Indians, Missionaries, and Religious Translation: Creating Wampa-
noag Christianity in Seventeenth-Century Martha’s Vineyard, 62 WM. & MARY Q. 141, 169 (2005).
See generally WILLIAM KELLAWAY, THE NEW ENGLAND COMPANY, 1649–1776: MISSIONARY SOCI-
ETY TO THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1961).
46 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 34–37. See generally KRISTINA BROSS, DRY BONES AND INDIAN
SERMONS: PRAYING INDIANS IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2004).
47 See JOSEPH TRACY, HISTORY OF AMERICAN MISSIONS TO THE HEATHEN, FROM THEIR
COMMENCEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME 9–10, 13–14 (Worcester, Spooner & Howland,
1840).
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Archbishop of Canterbury to “appoint[ ]” “two Protestant Ministers . . . with a
competent allowance to dwell amongst them, in order to instruct them in the
true Religion and confirm them in their duty to [her] Majesty.”48  The point
was to “more effectively . . . secure their fidelity”—to the Crown, if not also to
God.49  When London underfunded the missions,50 Sir William Johnson, the
New York Superintendent of Indian Affairs, took the initiative to sponsor mis-
sionaries to the Mohawks.51  Working closely with Chief Joseph Brant, a com-
mitted Anglican, Johnson built chapels, persuaded the New England
Company to send a missionary, and prepared a new edition of the Mohawk
Prayer Book.52  The Mohawks converted to Anglicanism, becoming “a Friend
and Ally at the same time; both against the remaining Heathen, and a much
more dangerous Neighbour”—the Catholic French.53
For an Anglican colony like New York, there was little daylight between
promoting the official religion and confirming political loyalty.  Predictably,
the missionary efforts of nonestablishment denominations in the colonies
met official resistance.  Georgia evicted the Moravians, a pacifist group that
had been harried out of Germany,54 for refusing to bear arms,55 and during
the Seven Years’ and Revolutionary Wars, Native- and Anglo-Americans alike
drove them to the Ohio territory.56  Colonial government-missionary part-
nerships sought to create not only good Christians, but also trustworthy
subjects.
During the Revolution, the Continental Congress set a pattern for gov-
ernment-missionary partnerships that would endure into the constitutional
republic.  The Articles of Confederation vested in Congress “the sole and
exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians.”57  Three congressional-missionary partnerships, all politi-
cally strategic, were important precursors to federal practice.  First, Congress
funded the education of “nine or ten Indian youth” “under the care of doc-
48 Representation of the Lords of Trade Concerning New-York (Apr. 2, 1703), in 4
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 1035, 1037
(E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co., Printers 1854).
49 Id.
50 See BEAVER, supra note 15, at 16–17.
51 Id. at 19.
52 Id. at 20.
53 See Thomas Secker, A Sermon Preached Before the Incorporated Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (Feb. 20, 1740-1), in FRANK J. KLINGBERG,
ANGLICAN HUMANITARIANISM IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 213, 224 (1940).
54 EDMUND SCHWARZE, HISTORY OF THE MORAVIAN MISSIONS AMONG SOUTHERN INDIAN
TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (1923); 2 ZEISBERGER’S DIARY, 1781–1789, at ix (Eugene
F. Bliss trans., ed., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1885).
55 SCHWARZE, supra note 53, at 12–13.
56 1 ZEISBERGER’S DIARY, supra note 54, at xiii, xviii, xx–xxi; SILVER, supra note 44, at
265.
57 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX.  Article 9 provided a caveat for “Indi-
ans, not members of any of the states” and provided that “the legislative right of any state
within its own limits be not infringed or violated.” Id. See Ablavsky, supra note 27, at
1009–13.
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tor [Eleazar] Wheelock” at “a seminary for the instruction of Indian youth,”
later Dartmouth College.58  Next, at General Washington’s request,59 Con-
gress funded Reverend Samuel Kirkland’s mission (and espionage) among
the Tuscarora and Oneida nations.60  The partnership with Kirkland became
a cornerstone of the Washington administration’s relationship with the Iro-
quois.  Finally, Congress articulated a general policy of government-mission-
ary partnerships, instructing the Indian commissioners “to consider of
proper places, in their respective Departments, for the residence of Ministers
and Schoolmasters” that “a friendly commerce between the people of the
United Colonies and the Indians, and the propagation of the Gospel, and the
cultivation of the civil arts among the latter, may produce many and inestima-
ble advantages to both.”61
Congress’s efforts to evangelize and educate Native Americans were obvi-
ously culturally chauvinistic, paternalistic, and imperialistic.62  As explained
58 Constitution of Indian Departments (Jul. 12, 1775), in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 174, 176–77 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905) (appropriat-
ing $500); Report from Committee for Indian Affairs (Sept. 19, 1776), in 2 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES ser. 5, at 1362, 1362 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter
Force 1851) (appropriating, at General Schuyler’s request, an additional $500); see Philip
Schuyler, Letter from General Schuyler to Governour Trumbull (Sept. 2, 1776), in 2 AMER-
ICAN ARCHIVES ser. 5, supra, at 125, 125.
59 George Washington, Letter from General Washington to Continental Congress
(Sept. 30, 1775), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 852, 852–53 (Peter Force ed., Washing-
ton, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1840) (stressing “the importance of his station . . . to
the United Colonies”).
60 Rev. Samuel Kirkland Continued in His Mission Among the Indians (Nov. 11,
1775), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1918, 1918 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St.
Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1840) (providing funds for “past services,” for “endeavouring to
conciliate the good will of those people towards the inhabitants of the United Colonies,” and
“for the propagation of the Gospel amongst the Indians”); Samuel Kirkland, Copy of a
Letter Intercepted from S. Kirkland to Mr. Schuyler (May 22, 1776), in 1 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES ser. 5, at 867, 867 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force
1848) (illustrating Kirkland’s espionage); Letter to the Reverend Mr. Kirkland, and an
Address to the Mohawks (Apr. 4, 1775), in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1349, 1349
(Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1837); Commissioners of
the Northern Department Directed to Employ Mr. Kirkland Among the Six Nations of
Indians (Jul. 18, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1884, 1884–85 (Peter Force ed.,
Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1839).  See generally PRUCHA, supra note 15,
at 40.
61 Report on the Memorial of the Rev. Mr. Sampson Occum (Feb. 5, 1776), in 4 AMERI-
CAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1662, 1662 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke &
Peter Force 1843); see Speech to Captain White-Eyes (Apr. 10, 1776), in 5 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1664, 1664 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter
Force 1844); Regulations for Indian Affairs in the Middle Department, Adopted (Apr. 10,
1776), in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 4, at 1663, 1663 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St.
Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1844); see also Thomas Cushing, Letter from Thomas Cushing
to the President of Congress (Aug. 11, 1776), in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 5, supra note 60,
at 902, 902–03; Memorial of John Sergeant (Nov. 27, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES ser. 5,
at 868, 868–69 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1853).
62 See infra Section V.B.
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below, Christianization, education, and civilizational development were inex-
tricable facets of the cultural paradigm of elite white Americans.63  This para-
digm provided the assumptions that fueled government-missionary
partnerships through the early republic.
B. The Constitutional Framework
The U.S. Constitution established a framework for the legal relationship
between the Native nations, the states, and the confederacy.  It allocated vir-
tually all authority to enter into treaties and regulate “Commerce . . . with the
Indian Tribes” to the federal government.64  Within the states, “Indians not
taxed” would not be counted for purposes of apportionment or federal
taxes.65  This provision probably distinguished between “Tribes” that were
tributaries of the states, or “members of any of the states,”66 as the Articles of
Confederation put it, and Native nations that Anglo-Americans considered to
have retained their sovereignty.67  Yet many questions of overlapping sover-
eignty among the Native nations, states, and federal government persisted
well into the nineteenth century.68  So, too, did many questions regarding
the scope of the Establishment Clause, which prohibited Congress from
enacting any “law respecting an establishment of religion.”69  Within this
indeterminate constitutional framework, the Washington administration set
the pattern of practice that would lead to the Civilization Fund Act of 1819.
C. The Washington Administration
1. The Washington-Knox Framework
Under the leadership of President Washington and Secretary of War
Henry Knox, the government’s goals in Native American relations were to
promote peace, facilitate trade, and maximize land use.  The principal means
were peace treaties (which sometimes included the purchase of land),70 gifts
of agricultural implements and livestock,71 and the regulation of frontier
trade by superintendents, agents, and factors at trading posts.72  Beginning
63 See id.
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65 Id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
66 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX.
67 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012,
1014, 1058 (2015).
68 See LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN
AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 32, 60, 90 (2010).
69 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part IV.
70 See George Washington, Washington to Senate (Sept. 17, 1789), in 1 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 53 (James D. Richardson ed., New York,
Bureau of National Literature, Inc. 1897).
71 See, e.g., George Washington, Washington to Senate (Mar. 23, 1792), in 1 A COMPI-
LATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 114.
72 See PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 89–134.
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in 1790, Congress regulated land purchases and commerce with the Native
nations through a series of Intercourse Acts.73  The Act of 1793 appropriated
$20,000 per year to promote “civilization” by purchasing gifts for Native peo-
ple and paying federal agents.74  Subsequent iterations retained the provi-
sion but reduced the allocation to $15,000 per year.  The 1802 version also
authorized the President “to appoint such persons, from time to time, as tem-
porary agents, to reside among the Indians, as he shall think fit.”75  The
details of the expenditures under these acts have largely been lost to
history.76
Missionary partnerships were a relatively small but important part of the
administration’s assimilation strategy.  On July 7, 1789, Knox told President
Washington that he believed the civilization of the Indians to be possible and
desirable, but, at the moment, “impracticable”—“an operation of compli-
cated difficulty.”77  He suggested two approaches.  The first was to give them
gifts to “introduce among the Indian tribes a love for exclusive property.”78
The second was to appoint “[m]issionaries of excellent moral character to
reside in their nation . . . [as] their friends and fathers.”79  “These men,” he
added, “should be made the instruments to work on the Indians.”80  Such a
plan “would most probably be attended with the salutary effect of attaching
[the tribes] to the interest of the United States.”81
Consistent with this recommendation, on August 29, 1789, Washington
instructed the federal commissioners to the southern tribes to settle a deli-
73 See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329;
Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of Mar.
30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2018)).
74 Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 9, 1 Stat. 329, 331.
75 Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 13, 2 Stat. 139, 143; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 13,
1 Stat. 469, 472; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, § 13, 1 Stat. 743, 747.
76 See Fischbacher, supra note 15, at 49. But see Michael D. Breidenbach, Religious
Tests, Loyalty Oaths, and Ecclesiastical Context of the First Amendment, in THE CAMBRIDGE COM-
PANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 189–90 (Michael D. Breidenbach
& Owen Anderson eds., 2020) (noting that then-Bishop John Carroll “reported” in 1800
“that at least two [Catholic] priests in the Native American territories received salaries from
the US federal government to ‘tend to their [the Native Americans’] civilisation, and teach
them the advantages of the Xtian [Christian] religion.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Letter from John Carroll to James Madison (Jan. 6, 1809), LIBR. OF CONG.: JAMES MADISON
PAPERS, 1723–1836, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mjm.10_0914_0915 (last visited Oct. 30,
2020))).
77 Henry Knox, Gen. Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of the United States, in
continuation (Jul. 7, 1789), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 52, 53 (Walter
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832).  James
Madison had introduced the proposal that became the Bill of Rights on June 8, 1789. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 440–41 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed. 1834).  The states ratified those consti-
tutional amendments, including the First Amendment, on December 15, 1791.
78 Knox, supra note 77, at 53.
79 Id. at 54.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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cate and important land dispute between the Creeks and the State of Geor-
gia.82  Incidental to the commissioners’ primary objective, the President
instructed them to “endeavor to obtain a stipulation for certain missionaries,
to reside in the nation, provided the General Government should think
proper to adopt the measure.”83  The missionaries would “be precluded from
trade, or attempting to purchase any lands,” but should “have a certain rea-
sonable quantity, per head, allowed for the purpose of cultivation.”84  “The
object of this establishment,” wrote Washington, “would be the happiness of
the Indians, teaching them the great duties of religion and morality, and to
inculcate a friendship and attachment to the United States.”85
Two years later, in his Third Annual Address to Congress, Washington
discussed Native American affairs at length.  His first priority was to establish
“an impartial dispensation of justice,” especially with respect to land.86  He
also urged that “such rational experiments should be made for imparting to
them the blessings of civilization as may from time to time suit their condi-
tion.”87  He suggested that “the Executive of the United States should be
enabled to employ the means to which the Indians have been long accus-
tomed for uniting their immediate interests with the preservation of
peace.”88  Given the government-missionary partnerships of the past, this
may amount to a proposal to put such partnerships on a statutory footing.  In
all, “[a] system corresponding with the mild principles of religion and phi-
lanthropy toward an unenlightened race of men, whose happiness materially
depends on the conduct of the United States, would be as honorable to the
national character as conformable to the dictates of sound policy.” 89
2. Reverend Samuel Kirkland
The most intriguing government-missionary partnership during the
Washington administration was with Samuel Kirkland.  A colonial board for
the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge had appointed
Kirkland to serve as a missionary in 1766.90  As discussed above, Kirkland had
82 George Washington & Henry Knox, Instructions to the Commissioners for Treating
with the Southern Indians (Aug 29, 1789), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS,
supra note 77, at 65, 66.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.  I have seen no congressional evidence regarding such a plan.
86 George Washington, Third Annual Address (Oct. 25, 1791), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 95, 96.
87 Id. at 96–97.
88 Id. at 97.
89 Id. at 97; see also George Washington, George Washington’s Farewell Address (Sept.
19, 1796), in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 468, 468 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark
David Hall eds., 2009).
90 ELEAZER WHEELOCK, KIRKLAND’S APPOINTMENT AS MISSIONARY TO THE INDIANS (June
19, 1766), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE 25, 25 (Joseph D.
Ibbotson & S.N.D. North eds., 1922).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 15  8-DEC-20 9:34
2020] forgotten  federal-missionary  partnerships 691
served at Washington’s request as an intelligence agent and emissary for the
Continental Congress to the Iroquois since 1775.91
In 1791, the administration’s goal of guaranteeing the loyalty of the Iro-
quois coincided with Kirkland’s plan to build a boarding school for Native
and white American students.  Kirkland wrote to Knox and Timothy Picker-
ing, then Postmaster General and Superintendent of Indian Affairs and
future Secretary of War, for the “aid and countenance of [the] Govern-
ment.”92  His proposed curriculum was ambitious.  In addition to reading,
writing, and arithmetic, it would include instruction in “the principles of
human nature, and the history of civil society, . . . laws, government, agricul-
ture, industry, etc.—that [the students] may be able clearly to discern the
difference between a state of nature and a state of civilization.” 93  Addition-
ally, Kirkland proposed that the students “be taught the principles of natural
and the doctrines of revealed religion.  Moral precepts and the more plain
and express doctrines of Christianity should be constantly inculcated, as the
minds of the youth are able to receive them.”94  Upon Knox’s request, Kirk-
land provided a detailed “statement of the expences requisite to give efficacy
to the Plan.”95
At about the same time, Knox asked Kirkland to serve as the govern-
ment’s agent to persuade the leaders of the Iroquois to attend a conference
in Philadelphia with President Washington.  The United States wanted to
ensure the tribes’ friendship and, hopefully, to persuade them to mediate the
hostilities between the United States and the Northwest federation.96  Knox
asked Kirkland to recruit the attendees—especially Chief Joseph Brant—to
escort them to Philadelphia, and to assure the government’s friendship
toward them.  Knox paid Kirkland’s way, as well as “a reasonable
compensation.”97
91 See supra subsection I.C.2.
92 SAMUEL KIRKLAND, A PLAN OF EDUCATION FOR THE INDIANS, PARTICULARLY OF THE
FIVE NATIONS (Oct. 4, 1791), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE,
supra note 90, at 27, 31.
93 Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
94 Id.
95 Samuel Kirkland, Samuel Kirkland to Henry Knox, Secretary of War in the Adminis-
tration of George Washington (Dec. 6, 1791), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COL-
LEGE, supra note 90, at 32, 32.
96 See DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN & WHITE SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERAL-
ISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 141–42 (2008).
97 Henry Knox, A Statement of the Measures Taken, and the Overtures Made, to Pro-
cure a Peace with the Indians Northwest of the Ohio (Dec. 20, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 226, 226; see Henry Knox, The Secretary of War to
the Rev. Samuel Kirkland—Per Colonel Procter and Lieutenant Sedam (Mar. 7, 1792), in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 229, 229 (providing $700 to be
sure the Indians are “satisfactorily treated on the road”); Henry Knox, To the Rev. Samuel
Kirkland—Per Mr. James M. Reed, Express (Feb. 25, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 228, 228; see also Henry Knox, The Secretary of War to the
Rev. Samuel Kirkland (Jan. 9, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 77, at 226, 226.
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The March 1792 conference between Washington and the Iroquois was
deemed a success.98  Within a month of the conference, Washington ratified
an article authorizing payment of a yearly sum of $1500 for the Iroquois and
Stockbridge Indians, noting that he approved of Colonel Pickering’s plan for
their civilization.99  The exact disposition of these funds is unknown.  Within
a month, Pickering had authorized the distribution of $415 to the Stock-
bridge, Oneida, and Tuscarora Indians for livestock and agricultural imple-
ments.100  The Oneida’s share was paid to Kirkland.101
Kirkland capitalized on the federal government’s financial support to
also solicit funds from mission organizations and, probably, the state of New
York.  He wrote to the board of the American branch of the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel that “Congress had granted 1500 dollars annually
for the term of 21 years, for the express purpose of introducing civilization
among the five Nations,” including for “a common school master in four
establishments.”102  By the end of the year, the American board had recom-
mended annual financial support for an instructor, books, stationery, and
tuition.103
In 1793, Kirkland received a charter for the school from the Regents of
the University of the State of New York.104  With Alexander Hamilton as the
star member of the board of trustees, the school was called the Hamilton
Oneida Academy.105  (It is now Hamilton College.)  Located in Herkimer
County, “contiguous to the Oneida Nation of Indians,” the school was within
the territory of the state of New York, and served white and Native American
students.106  Kirkland remained an ad hoc agent for the United States at least
through 1795.107  The record is unclear about how much money the federal
98 See NICHOLS, supra note 96, at 142.
99 Washington to Headmen of the Five Nations (Apr. 25, 1792), in PAPERS OF THE WAR
DEPARTMENT, 1784–1800: SAMUEL KIRKLAND PAPERS, https://wardepartmentpapers.org/s/
home/item/42637
100 Appropriation of Money to Indian Tribes (May 4, 1792), in PAPERS OF THE WAR
DEPARTMENT, 1784–1800: SPECIAL FOLDER, https://wardepartmentpapers.org/s/home/
item/42872
101 Id.
102 Samuel Kirkland, Samuel Kirkland to Peter Thacher (June 6, 1792), in DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 43, 43; see also Samuel Kirkland,
Samuel Kirkland to Peter Thacher (June 30, 1792), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF HAMIL-
TON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 45, 48.
103 Samuel Kirkland, Samuel Kirkland to Peter Thacher (June 6, 1792), in DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 43, 48–49.
104 Charter of Hamilton Oneida Academy (Jan. 31, 1793), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 68, 68–69.
105 Samuel Kirkland, Kirkland’s Plan for the Academy (Dec. 6, 1792), in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 49, 50.
106 Original Subscription Form, Hamilton Oneida Academy (Aug. 1790), in DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 58, 58.
107 See Samuel Kirkland to Timothy Pickering (Jan. 19, 1795), in PAPERS OF THE WAR
DEPARTMENT, 1784–1800: SAMUEL KIRKLAND PAPERS, https://wardepartmentpapers.org/s/
home/item/49184
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government contributed to the cause, but it could not have been much:
within a few years Kirkland had taken on debt to cover the school’s costs, and
a few years later it was completely abandoned, later resurrected by the Board
of Regents.108
Two exchanges during the government’s partnership with Kirkland shed
light on how Washington and his officers did—and did not—conceive of the
Establishment Clause.  The first is Colonel Pickering’s response to Kirkland’s
proposed curriculum.  Pickering generally supported Kirkland’s plan, claim-
ing that he had submitted one of his own to the President the prior year.  But
he discouraged Kirkland from teaching “the peculiar doctrines of revealed
religion.”109  By this, Pickering probably meant beliefs based on special reve-
lation—scripture, and, perhaps, church tradition—rather than nature or rea-
son alone.  Teaching such doctrines would cause two problems, he thought.
The first was that the student “would find it difficult to comprehend
them.”110  The second was that “different teachers might place them in very
different points of view; and such different views of the same thing (by all
their teachers perhaps declared essential to salvation) would confound and
discourage them; and probably make them suspect the whole to be an impos-
ture.”111  By contrast, Pickering endorsed the idea of teaching the students
“the principles of natural religion, and moral precepts.”112  These principles,
“applicable to all people . . . will be important to explain and inculcate.”113
Along these lines, there is evidence that Secretary Knox later prohibited the
use of government funds for the teaching of revealed religion “excepting
[to] those Indians to whom any of its mysteries have already been
unfolded.”114
Pickering’s rationale is important.  He made no claim that it would be
unlawful or even inappropriate for the government to support the teaching
of revealed religion as part of a comprehensive education.  His concern was
that it would be counterproductive.  Knox’s proviso may reflect the same con-
cern.  Knox was a champion of the autonomy of the Native nations, so he
may also have been concerned that proselytization would be out of line.115
But since there was nothing coercive about Kirkland’s proposal, Knox may
have merely wanted to make the school as attractive to as many Native stu-
dents as possible, including those with reservations about Christianity.  With-
out more evidence it is impossible to say.  None of the evidence, however,
108 Herbert John Lennox, Samuel Kirkland’s Mission to the Iroquois 176–77 (Aug.
1932) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author); see Proceedings of
the Regents of the University of the State of New York (May 22, 1812), in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 107, 107.
109 Timothy Pickering, Timothy Pickering to Samuel Kirkland (Dec. 4, 1791), in DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF HAMILTON COLLEGE, supra note 90, at 35, 35, 36–37.
110 Id. at 36.
111 Id. at 36–37.
112 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 Lennox, supra note 108, at 172.
115 Thanks to Greg Ablavsky for pointing this out.
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suggests that either Knox or Pickering believed there were constitutional lim-
its on the government’s support for religious education within the territory
of a state.
Kirkland may have accepted Pickering’s advice, at least in principle.  His
subsequent proposal to the Board of Regents stated that “[a]s their minds
grow ripe for it (more particularly the Indian youth) let the evidences, doc-
trines, precepts, and sanctions of Revelation and the gospel plan of salvation
by a Redeemer be unfolded to them, together with their important and inti-
mate relation to the Supreme Being be pointed out.”116  In practice, though,
Kirkland did not shy away from revealed religion.  The clergy who visited the
school reported that Kirkland “discoursed to the Oneidas on all the intricate
points of Calvinism.”117
A second exchange during the government’s partnership with Kirkland
is perhaps the most important document from Washington’s hand about the
bounds of the Establishment Clause.  Scholars have so far ignored it.  In May
1792, scarcely a month after Washington had hosted Kirkland and the Iro-
quois chiefs at Philadelphia, he penned a letter to John Carroll, Archbishop
of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.  Carroll had apparently
proposed a partnership to “instruct[ ] the Indians, within and contiguous to
the United States, in the principles and duties of Christianity.”118
Washington’s response declining the request was, characteristically,119 a
model of decorum.  After thanking the Archbishop for his “pious and benev-
olent wishes” of “securing the permanent attachment of our savage neigh-
bors” “upon the mild principles of religion and philanthropy,” he seems to
distance himself from an evangelistic motive: “I have no doubt but such mea-
sures will be pursued, as may seem best calculated to communicate liberal
instruction, and the blessings of society, to their untutored minds.”120
Washington’s rationale for declining the partnership shed light on his
understanding of the federal government’s authority over Native peoples and
religion.  As for the “western Indians,” “[t]he war now existing” between
them and the United States “prevents, for the present, any interference of
this nature with them.” 121  Practicability, not law, prevented such a mission.
As for those “who dwell in the eastern extremity of the United States,”
they are “according to the best information that I can obtain, so situated as to
be rather considered as a part of the inhabitants of the State of Massachusetts
than otherwise, and that State has always considered them as under its imme-
116 KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 56.
117 ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROTESTANT
MISSIONS AND AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE, 1787–1862, at 50 (2014).
118 George Washington, Letter to John Carroll (Apr. 10, 1792), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 116, 116 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1891).
119 See JOHN G. WEST, JR., THE POLITICS OF REVELATION AND REASON: RELIGION AND CIVIC
LIFE IN THE NEW NATION 40 (1996).
120 Washington, supra note 118, at 117–18.
121 Id. at 117. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 61–67 (regarding the war).
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diate care and protection.”122  He thus recommended that it “would seem
most proper” for the Archbishop to direct his “application” with respect to
that group “to the government of Massachusetts.”123  Washington probably
had in mind the unique situation of the Native peoples in Massachusetts.
They had been “surrounded by Anglo-American communities” for genera-
tions and, unlike the nations on the frontier, “were subject to state law.”124
Washington may have been relying on tradition and their status as state tax-
payers to distinguish them from “independent” tribes.125
Yet Washington may have also been influenced by the Establishment
Clause.  Some jurists today believe that at least one purpose of the Clause was
to prevent federal interference with state religious establishments.126  Massa-
chusetts certainly had what many considered to be an establishment of relig-
ion, and it was decidedly not Catholic.127  With respect to Massachusetts, at
least, Washington may have had more than one constitutional reason to
reject Carroll’s proposal.
Finally, Washington turned to the “[t]he Indians of the Five Nations.”128
“[I]n their religious concerns,” he explained, they were “under the immedi-
ate superintendence of the Reverend Mr. Kirkland.” 129  Kirkland, of course,
was Washington’s agent.  He may have thought multiple missionary-agents
would risk confusion or dilution of the government’s agenda.  Or he may
have shared the widespread suspicion of the political loyalties of the Catholic
Church.  In any case, he obviously did not believe the Constitution categori-
cally prohibited partnering with a missionary.  He may have thought that the
Establishment Clause cautioned against the federal interference with the
Massachusetts religious establishment, but he clearly believed that the Consti-
tution in at least some cases permitted the federal government’s support of
religious instruction as part of a comprehensive education.
3. Reverend John Heckenwelder
Though perhaps the model,130 Kirkland was not Washington’s only mis-
sionary-agent.  In the spring of 1792, Secretary Knox instructed Judge Rufus
122 Washington, supra note 118, at 117.
123 Id.
124 Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1054.
125 See id. at 1054–55; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
126 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–54 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32–34 (1998);
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 20–21 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089–92 (1995); Vin-
cent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its
Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 629–30 (2006).
127 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630–1883: THE BAP-
TISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1054 (1971).
128 Washington, supra note 118, at 117.
129 Id.
130 NICHOLS, supra note 96, at 122.
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Putnam to negotiate peace with the Native nations north of the Ohio
River.131  At Putnam’s request, Knox asked John Heckenwelder, a Moravian
missionary to the Delaware in western Pennsylvania and Ohio, to accompany
Putnam, and offered to pay Heckenwelder’s way.132
By November 8, 1792, Putnam had concluded a treaty of peace with the
Wabash and Illinois.133  At Washington’s direction, Knox informed the Sen-
ate of the treaty, enclosing a speech Heckenwelder had made to the Native
nations. 134  Among other things, Heckenwelder had encouraged them “not
to look to what has passed, but to come forth and speak to this Great Chief
[Washington], who will, with your assistance, remove all that is bad, and
make every thing clear and light again.  Rise, therefore, and don’t lose this
fine opportunity.”135  A year later Knox called on the missionary to accom-
pany the U.S. commissioners to the western nations and again “use his influ-
ence towards a peace.”136
On November 6, 1792, about six months after his letter to Archbishop
Carroll and only two days before Knox delivered Heckenwelder’s message to
Congress, President Washington delivered his fourth annual address to Con-
gress.  Among other things, he proposed “[t]o enable, by competent rewards,
the employment of qualified and trusty persons to reside among [the Native
nations] as agents,” and urged Congress to develop “an eligible plan . . . for
promoting civilization among the friendly tribes.”137  Given the immediate
context, Washington likely had an expansion of the missionary partnerships
in mind.
D. The Jefferson Administration
Thomas Jefferson never personally proposed a government-missionary
partnership.  This is perhaps unsurprising: Jefferson had a low view of what
131 Id. at 142.
132 Henry Knox, Instructions to Benjamin Lincoln, of Massachusetts, Beverley Ran-
dolph, of Virginia, and Timothy Pickering, of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1763), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 340, 341; Henry Knox, The Secretary of
War to Mr. John Heckenwelder (May 18, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 233, 233; see also Henry Knox, The Secretary of War to Mr. John
Heckenwelder, at Bethlehem (May 21, 1792), 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS,
supra note 77, at 234, 234.
133 Henry Knox, Wabash and Illinois Tribes (Nov. 8, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 319, 319.
134 See John Heckewelder, Address to the Delaware Indians (Oct. 5, 1792), in 1 AMERI-
CAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 319, 319.
135 Id. at 320.
136 Henry Knox, Instructions to Benjamin Lincoln, of Massachusetts, Beverley Ran-
dolph, of Virginia, and Timothy Pickering, of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1763), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 340–341; see also NICHOLS, supra note 96, at
147.
137 George Washington, Speech to Both Houses of Congress (Nov. 6, 1792), in 12 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 118, at 205, 208.
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Pickering had called “revealed religion.”138  In general, he preferred to leave
religious doctrine out of education.139  He had always believed agriculture
and private property were the key to Native American progress.140  He
repeatedly urged Congress to provide for their education in the agricultural
arts141 and supported the federal government’s purchase of their land for
parceling into lots suitable for raising livestock and crops.142  By the end of
his administration, he went so far as to repudiate “the ancient and totally
ineffectual [plan] of beginning [the process of assimilating the Native Ameri-
cans] with religious missionaries.”143
Nevertheless, Jefferson’s administration provided money for at least one
missionary school and, pursuant to a treaty, funded the construction
of a Catholic Church and the salary of a priest.  In spite of his leadership
against religious assessments in Virginia and general anticlericalism, Jeffer-
son never raised a constitutional objection to the government-missionary
partnerships.144
1. Gideon Blackburn and the Cherokees
The Presbyterian General Assembly gave $200 to Gideon Blackburn,
then serving as a frontier pastor, to spend two months conducting a mission
to the Cherokee nation.145  President Jefferson decided to invest in the
enterprise.  Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote to U.S. agent Colonel
Return J. Meigs:
The President of the United States is of opinion that in conformity with the
intentions of the Government respecting the melioration of the present situ-
138 See WEST, supra note 119, at 56–57.
139 See, e.g., ALAN TAYLOR, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S EDUCATION 40, 53, 188 (2019).
140 See PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 139.
141 See Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 314, 314; Thomas Jefferson,
Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives (Jan. 18, 1803), in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 340, 341;
Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message (Oct. 17, 1803), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 345, 347; Thomas Jefferson,
Fourth Annual Message (Nov. 8, 1804), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 357, 359–60; Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural
Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS, supra note 70, at 366, 368; Thomas Jefferson, Seventh Annual Message (Oct. 27,
1807), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70,
at 413, 416; Thomas Jefferson, Eighth Annual Message (Nov. 8, 1808), in 1 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 70, at 439, 442.
142 NICHOLS, supra note 96, at 194.
143 Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Apr. 7, 1809), in 5
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Derby & Jack-
son 1859).
144 See infra Section III.C.
145 Dorothy C. Bass, Gideon Blackburn’s Mission to the Cherokees: Christianization and Civili-
zation, 52 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 203, 206, 209 (1974); see also Lester Lamon, Gideon Black-
burn: A Contemporary’s Perspective, 62 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 354, 354–55 (1984).
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ation of our Indian Neighbours, some aid ought to be afforded to the
laudible plan contemplated by the Religious Society, and particularly by Mr.
Blackburn.146
Dearborn told Meigs to help Blackburn negotiate the details of a school
with the Cherokee chiefs and to build a school house.  He also authorized
Meigs to provide up to $200–300 annually to help the school.147  At the same
time, though, Dearborn informed Blackburn that he would “have no claim
on the United States, for compensation for your services, other than what
may from time to time be deemed advisable.”148
With the Cherokees’ approval, Blackburn established a school in
Highwassee, Georgia.149  Students focused on reading, writing, math, and
memorizing hymns.  Advanced students learned the entire Westminster Shorter
Catechism.150  A year after the initial federal allocation, Secretary Dearborn
instructed Colonel Meigs “to afford [Blackburn] the aid of three or four hun-
dred dollars per annum” if the agent was “fully convinced of the utility of the
school.”151  According to the most fulsome historical review, “[a]lthough the
records for the subsequent years are incomplete, this money probably did
continue to be available annually.”152  Blackburn continued the mission,
expanding it to include another school at Sale Creek, Tennessee, until
1810.153
2. The Kaskaskia Treaty
Treaties between the United States and Native nations often included a
provision in which the federal government promised money for education
(among other things) in exchange for tribal land.  In 1803, the government
agreed to provide the Kaskaskia tribe, “the greater part” of which “have been
baptised and received into the Catholic church, to which they are much
attached” with an annual annuity of $100 for seven years “towards the sup-
port of a priest . . . who will engage to perform . . . the duties of his office,
and also to instruct as many of [the Kaskaskia] children as possible, in the
rudiments of literature.”154
146 Bass, supra note 145, at 209–10 (quoting Henry Dearborn, Letter from Henry Dear-
born to R.J. Meigs (July 1, 1803), in RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
LETTERS SENT, INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1800–1824 (1963)).
147 Id. at 210.
148 Id. (quoting Henry Dearborn, Letter from Henry Dearborn to Gideon Blackburn
(July 1, 1803), in RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, LETTERS SENT, INDIAN
AFFAIRS, 1800–1824, supra note 146).
149 Id. at 211–12.
150 Id. at 212.
151 Id. at 216 (quoting Henry Dearborn, Dearborn to Meigs (Nov. 1, 1804) in RECORDS
OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, LETTERS SENT, INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1800–1824, supra
note 146).
152 Id. at 216.
153 Id. at 219.
154 Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Senate (Oct. 31, 1803), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 77, at 687, 687–88.
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The provision appears to do what Jefferson had successfully opposed in
Virginia in the 1780s: use tax dollars to fund the salary of a clergy member
and to build a church.155  Jefferson may have distinguished the two on the
ground that the expenditure was attributable to the Kaskaskias, not the gov-
ernment.156  More than a century later, the Supreme Court advanced this
rationale to uphold such a treaty provision.157
Yet this reasoning is not entirely convincing.  A treaty reflects an agree-
ment between two parties, not one.  The United States agreed to use its
money to fund a priest and church in exchange for land just as much as the
Kaskaskias instructed the United States, as a trustee, to do so.  Furthermore,
there is no direct evidence that Jefferson justified the expenditures on the
formal distinction between a treaty and legislation.
Perhaps the most convincing rationale for Jefferson’s acquiescence to
the provision may be that, unlike the Virginia assessments, the treaty did not
coerce taxpayers to support religion against their consciences.  At the time,
the federal government’s revenue was mostly from the sale of land and taxes
on consensual activities such as trade.  By contrast, state governments
imposed religious assessments on all taxpayers and used the funds solely to
support clergy and churches.  The government would probably use money
raised by the sale of land ceded by the treaty to make the payments.  This
would therefore entail no governmental coercion of individual conscience,
Jefferson’s chief objection to religious assessments.158  Yet this is pure conjec-
ture; the most intriguing thing about the Kaskaskia treaty is that there is no
evidence Jefferson contemplated the provision’s constitutionality one way or
another.
E. The Madison and Monroe Administrations
The Second Great Awakening was perhaps the most important social
development in the United States of the early nineteenth century.  Demo-
cratic sentiment merged with religious piety.159  Personal, evangelical, and
enthusiastic forms of Protestantism flourished and denominations prolifer-
ated.160  Within and across denominations, evangelicals established a variety
of benevolent societies, including societies devoted to mission work.161
As the nation settled into a newfound sense of security after the War of
1812, mission societies grew more ambitious.  The catalyst for missions to
155 See infra Part IV.
156 See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town of
Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405 (2015).
157 See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 77, 81 (1908).
158 See infra Part IV.
159 See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY
(1989).
160 MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN
165–208 (2002).
161 See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 164–70 (2007).
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Native groups was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mis-
sions (“American Board”), a New England–based Congregational association
that self-consciously sought to emulate the Mayhew and Eliot missions of the
seventeenth century.162  In 1816, the Board commissioned Cyrus Kingsbury
to be its first missionary to the Cherokee nation.163  On his journey south,
Kingsbury stopped in Washington to “communicate[ ] the design of the
Board to the Heads of Departments.”164
Secretary of War William H. Crawford told Kingsbury that he would
direct Colonel Meigs, the U.S. agent to the Cherokees, “to erect a comforta-
ble school-house, and another for the teacher and such as may board with
him” and to “furnish two ploughs, six hoes, and as many axes, for the pur-
pose of introducing the art of cultivation among the pupils.”165  Crawford
also promised to direct “from time to time, to cause other school-houses to
be erected, as they shall become necessary, and as the expectation of ultimate
success shall justify the expenditure.”166  The houses and furnishings would
remain public property “to be occupied and employed for the benefit of the
nation.”167  “The only return which is expected by the President is an annual
report of the state of the school, its progress, and its future prospects.”168
Crawford emphasized that Congress would be watching; if the mission was
successful, “the means of forwarding your beneficent views will be more
directly and liberally bestowed by that enlightened body.”169
Apparently, all concerned shared the cooperative spirit.  While in Wash-
ington, Kingsbury spoke repeatedly with Colonel Meigs and with several
Cherokee leaders.  Kingsbury reported that Meigs “may be relied upon, as a
firm and substantial friend to the object of the mission” and that the “Indians
also appeared to be pleased with the design.”170
The American Board of Commissioners’ committee was delighted with
the mission’s promising start and optimistic about its potential.  While the
162 See WILLIAM E. STRONG, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN BOARD 35 (1910); JOSEPH
TRACY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS 34–35
(New York, M.W. Dodd 2d ed. 1842).
163 Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., Cyrus Kingsbury—Missionary to the Choctaws, 50 J. PRESBYTE-
RIAN HIST. 267, 270 (1972).
164 AM. BD. OF COMM’RS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS, FIRST TEN ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS 134 (Boston, Crocker & Brew-
ster 1834); JOSEPH W. PHILLIPS, JEDIDIAH MORSE AND NEW ENGLAND CONGREGATIONALISM
206 (1983).
165 William Crawford, Letter from William Crawford to Cyrus Kingsbury (May 14,
1816), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 478, 478 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S.
Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834); AM. BD. OF COMM’RS FOR FOREIGN MIS-
SIONS, supra note 164; see Cyrus Kingsbury, Copy of a Letter from C. Kingsbury to the
Secretary of War (May 2, 1816), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra, at 477,
477.
166 Crawford, supra note 164.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. See generally DeRosier, supra note 163.
170 AM. BD. OF COMM’RS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS, supra note 164, at 135.
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government made no comment about the evangelical nature of the enter-
prise, the American Board’s religious objectives were clear.  “[T]he present
plan” was
[t]o establish schools in the different parts of the tribe under the missionary
direction and superintendence, for the instruction of the rising generation
in common school learning, in the useful arts of life, and in Christianity, so
as gradually, with the divine blessing to make the whole tribe English in their
language, civilized in their habits, and Christian in their religion.171
A few years later, while lobbying Congress to enact the Civilization Fund
Act of 1819, President Monroe visited the establishment.  According to a let-
ter from the supervising instructor, President Monroe:
was pleased to express his approbation of the plan of instruction, particu-
larly as the children were taken into the family, taught to work, &c.  He
thought this the best, and perhaps the only way, to civilize and christianize
the Indians; and assured us he was well pleased with the conduct and
improvement of the children.172
Dissatisfied with the log cabin the missionaries were erecting for the
female students, Monroe “advised that we put another kind of building in
place . . . a good two story house, with brick or stone chimneys, glass windows,
&c., and that it be done at the public expense.”173  With that, Monroe
directed Colonel Meigs “to pay the balance of [the missionaries’] account,
for what you have expended on these buildings, and also to defray the
expense of the house, you are now about to build.”174  Like prior govern-
ment-missionary partnerships, the Madison and Monroe administration part-
nerships were ad hoc: politically strategic, denominationally opportunistic,
and focused on promoting Christianity as one component of a comprehen-
sive education into white American culture.
II. THE CIVILIZATION FUND ACT OF 1819
Washington’s strategy of using missionaries to assimilate Native peoples
reached its institutional fulfillment with the Civilization Fund Act of 1819.
Until its repeal in 1873, the Act authorized the President to spend $10,000
per year to “employ capable persons of good moral character” to teach
Native students basic literacy and agriculture. 175  Virtually all of the money
went to Christian mission associations.  No one contested its constitutionality.
171 Id.; see also ROBERT SPARKS WALKER, TORCHLIGHTS TO THE CHEROKEES: THE BRAINERD
MISSION 22 (The Overmountain Press 1993) (1931).
172 AM. BD. OF COMM’RS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS, supra note 164, at 240.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, § 1, 3 Stat. 516, 516.
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A. Legislative History
The architect of the Act was Thomas McKenney, Superintendent of
Indian Affairs and ardent evangelical.176  Upon reading a report of a Mora-
vian mission to the Cherokee nation, he hatched a plan for Congress to enter
the field.177  McKenney sent circulars to the benevolent associations and pri-
vate persons dedicated to “meliorating the condition of the Indians,” recom-
mending they petition Congress for a bill to fund missionary efforts.178  The
Act was the result of their lobbying.179  The Civilization Fund program thus
belongs alongside other recent histories exploring the legal ramifications of
the social and political movements spurred by the Second Great
Awakening.180
This evangelizing spirit combined with the growing belief among federal
officials that assimilation into white political culture was the only way for the
tribes to survive.  In his 1817 address to Congress, President Monroe argued
that “it is our duty to make new efforts for the preservation, improvement,
and civilization of the native inhabitants.”181  Beyond reducing their land to
the amount necessary for an agricultural society, he urged Congress to con-
sider “whether other provisions, not stipulated by treaty, ought to be made
for these tribes, . . . particularly for their improvement in the arts of civilized
life.”182
A House of Representatives committee agreed.  “In the present state of
our country,” it determined, “one of two things seems to be necessary: either
that those sons of the forest should be moralized or exterminated.  Humanity
would rejoice at the former, but shrink with horror from the latter.”183  The
committee was not proposing that the federal government either educate or
exterminate the Native peoples; it was acknowledging the constant threat
posed to them by white frontiersmen.  According to the prevailing Enlighten-
176 PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 148. See generally HERMAN J. VIOLA, THOMAS L. MCKENNEY:
ARCHITECT OF AMERICA’S EARLY INDIAN POLICY: 1816–1830 (1974).
177 1 THOMAS L. M’KENNEY, MEMOIRS, OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL 33–35 (New York, Paine
& Burgess, 2d ed. 1846); see also id. at 313–15 (letter from Moravian missionary to
McKenney).
178 Id. at 35.
179 See, e.g., 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 426 (1818); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1819); PRUCHA,
supra note 15, at 150 (“[McKenney] and his missionary friends lobbied earnestly for the
measure . . . .”); William McLean, Report to the House of Representatives (Mar. 23, 1824),
in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 458 (“The passage of this
law was called for by many of the people in the most populous and influential sections of
our country” and “a religious community.”).
180 See, e.g., JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2014); Kellen Funk, Shall These Bones Live?  Property, Pluralism, and the Constitution of Evan-
gelical Reform, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 742 (2016) (reviewing COMPTON, supra).
181 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (1817).
182 Id.
183 Henry Southard, Trade, Intercourse, and Schools (Jan. 22, 1818), in 2 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 150, 151.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 27  8-DEC-20 9:34
2020] forgotten  federal-missionary  partnerships 703
ment-era theory of social progress,184 the remedy was a combination of edu-
cation and religion:
Put into the hands of their children the primer and the hoe, and they will
naturally, in time, take hold of the plough; and, as their minds become
enlightened and expand, the Bible will be their book, and they will grow up
in habits of morality and industry, leave the chase to those whose minds are
less cultivated, and become useful members of society.185
The committee therefore proposed a bill to establish trading houses and
to organize and encourage schools on the frontier.186  The program would
support existing mission schools and use the profits from the factory system
to endow new ones.  After amending the bill to omit the payments to mission-
ary schools and limit the total annual expenditure for new schools to
$10,000, the House dropped the payment provision altogether.  The reason
is unclear, but one scholar suggests that the plan of using profits from the
factory system was simply inconsistent with the policy of offering goods to
Native Americans without a markup to undercut private traders.187
The following year, McKenney “stimulated a flood of petitions to Con-
gress from religious groups.”188  In his annual address, President Monroe
clarified what he believed to be the stakes for the Native nations.  The only
way “to prevent their extinction,” let alone to promote “civilization,” was for
the United States to exercise “complete and undisputed” “control” over
them.189  “The hunter state will then be more easily abandoned, and
recourse will be had to the acquisition and culture of land, and to other
pursuits tending to dissolve the ties which connect them together as a savage
community, and to give a new character to every individual.”190  He urged
Congress to enact “some benevolent provisions” if “expedient and
practicable.”191
On Friday, February 19, a Senate committee reported the bill that would
become the Civilization Act.192  McKenney had recommended $100,000 per
year, which he said was “little enough since we got the Indians’ land for an
average of 23/4 cents the acre.”193  As reported, the bill called for the more
politically viable allocation of $10,000. 194
184 See PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 135–36.
185 Southard, supra note 183, at 151; see also John C. Calhoun, Progress Made in Civiliz-
ing the Indians (Jan. 15, 1820), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note
165, at 200, 201.
186 H. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1817).
187 PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 150.
188 Id.
189 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 17 (1818).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 246–47 (1819); see also id. at 273, 546; 34 ANNALS OF CONG.
1427, 1432 (1819).
193 VIOLA, supra note 176, at 41–43.
194 Id.
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The only reported debate on the bill occurred in the House on March 2.
Mr. Barbour moved on grounds of “expediency” to eliminate the provision of
the bill authorizing the President to employ persons of good moral character
as educators.195  Although he was not “at all opposed to the object which the
bill had in view,” Barbour doubted whether it “was . . . calculated to effect”
that object.196  The House rejected the motion 78 to 25 and passed the bill
without further debate.197
B. The Act and Regulations
The Act had two sections.  The first set forth the purpose of the pro-
gram, authorized the President to implement it, and gave parameters.  The
Act’s purpose was “providing against the further decline and final extinction
of the Indian tribes, adjoining the frontier settlements of the United States,
and for introducing among them the habits and arts of civilization.”198  The
Act authorized the President “to employ capable persons of good moral char-
acter, to instruct them in the mode of agriculture suited to their situation;
and for teaching their children in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and per-
forming such other duties as may be enjoined.”199  The President was to
exercise this authority “where he shall judge improvement in the habits and
condition of such Indians practicable, and that the means of instruction can
be introduced with their own consent.”200  The provision also gave the Presi-
dent authority to prescribe instructions and rules “for the regulation of their
[the teachers’] conduct.”201
The second section appropriated $10,000 annually for the project and
called for an annual accounting to Congress.202  The money was appropri-
ated out of general funds rather than from a treaty annuity or profits from
the sale of Indian land.
While the law did not formally require the use of clergy members or
even persons espousing religion, Secretary of War John Calhoun wasted no
time recruiting missionaries for the task.  He wrote that “[t]he President was
of opinion that the object of the act would be more certainly effected by
applying the sum appropriated in aid of the efforts of societies, or individu-
als, who might feel disposed to bestow their time and resources to effect the
object contemplated by it.”203  To that end, Calhoun sent a circular letter to
“those individuals and societies, who have directed their attention to the civi-
195 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1435 (1819).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, § 1, 3 Stat. 516, 516.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. § 1, 3 Stat. at 517.
202 Id. § 2, 3 Stat. at 517.
203 Calhoun, supra note 185, at 200; see also John C. Calhoun, Circular Letter (Sept. 3,
1819), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 201.
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lization of the Indians.”204  The letter directed “[s]uch associations or indi-
viduals who are already actually engaged in educating the Indians, and who
may desire the co-operation of the Government, [to] report to the Depart-
ment of War, to be laid before the President” information about their
existing or planned operations, goals, number of students, and mode of
instruction.205  Such information would help the President determine
whether to work “in co-operation” with the group or individual “and to make
a just distribution of the sum appropriated.”206  The government circulated
the letter “to all missionary agencies actually engaged in educational work
among the frontier Indians.”207
Not long afterward, Calhoun published a letter laying out further “regu-
lations” “to govern the future distribution” of funds to program partici-
pants.208  The letter said that the government would pay “two-thirds of the
expense of erecting the necessary buildings.”209  It also provided that the
President would allocate “to each institution which may be approved of by
him, a sum proportionate to the number of pupils belonging to each, regard
being had to the necessary expense of the establishment and the degree of
success which has attended it.”210  In modern nonestablishment terms, the
program would be “formally neutral” with respect to religion.211  It would
focus on effectiveness, measured in terms of “number of pupils” and “degree
of success,” rather than spreading a certain version of the gospel.  In an era
of religious growth and denominational schisms, this form of neutrality was
probably a political necessity.
What might count as “success?”  The letter made it clear that recipients
had a “duty . . . to impress on the minds of the Indians the friendly and
benevolent views of the Government towards them, and the advantage to
them in yielding to the policy of Government, and co-operating with it in
such measures as it may deem necessary for their civilization and happi-
ness.”212  According to Calhoun, “it is impossible that the object which it has
in view can be effected, and peace be habitually preserved, if the distrust of
the Indians as to its benevolent views should be excited.”213  The recipients,
though Christian missionaries, would also be the agents of the United States,
and the government would expect that their religious evangelism, whatever
form it may take, would not contravene the program’s main goal: to make
the students and their parents more amenable to the United States’ interests.
204 Calhoun, supra note 185, at 200.
205 Calhoun, supra note 203, at 201.
206 Id.
207 Fischbacher, supra note 15, at 56.
208 John C. Calhoun, Letter from John Calhoun to Department of War (Feb. 29, 1820),
in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 273.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001–02 (1990).
212 Calhoun, supra note 208.
213 Id.
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To upend Thomas More’s dying words, the missionaries would be God’s
good servants, but the United States’ first.214
C. Early Implementation
1. Reverend Jedidiah Morse’s Report
To implement the Act, Calhoun turned to the Reverend Jedidiah Morse
for information about the Native cultures and the existing mission schools.
Morse was a recently retired Massachusetts Congregationalist minister, a well-
known geographer, and a leading organizer of various benevolent associa-
tions, including the American Board of Commissioners.215  After conversa-
tions with Morse and Calhoun over the course of two months,216 President
Monroe authorized $500 from the civilization fund for Morse to tour the
frontier and “devise the most suitable plan to advance [Native] civilization
and happiness.”217  Calhoun instructed him “to ascertain the actual condi-
tion of the various tribes which you may visit, in a religious, moral, and politi-
cal point of view.” 218  Calhoun would report on their physical situations,
their views toward education, and the extent to which their “moral condi-
tion” had been corrupted by trade, and opine on how to promote “the object
of the Government in civilizing the Indians.”219
Along with his commission from the United States, Morse was “acting
under commissions from the Hon. and Rev. Society in Scotland for propagat-
ing Christian Knowledge, and the Northern Missionary Society in the State of
New-York.”220  From start to finish, Morse’s project embodied the govern-
ment-missionary partnership from the colonial era through the early repub-
lic.  After touring the northern tribes, he delivered his 496-page report to
Calhoun, who presented it to Congress on February 8, 1822.
2. Early Expenditures and Political Challenges
Congress initially took a keen interest in the administration of the civili-
zation funds.  Within a year of the Act’s passage, the House of Representa-
tives asked for an accounting.221  Secretary Calhoun provided the House with
a copy of the circular he had sent to the mission societies, a summary of the
existing missionary schools among the Indians, and assurance that the circu-
214 See PETER MARSHALL, HERETICS AND BELIEVERS: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH REFORMA-
TION 224 (2017).
215 See PHILLIPS, supra note 164, at 196–99.
216 Id. at 208; see John C. Calhoun, Copy of A Letter from the Secretary of War to the
Rev. Jedediah Morse (Feb. 7, 1820), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 165, at 273, 274.
217 Calhoun, supra note 215, at 273.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
INDIAN AFFAIRS 11 n.* (New Haven, S. Converse 1822).
221 See Calhoun, supra note 185, at 200–01.
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lar letter would “enable the President to apply, early in this year [1820], the
sum appropriated.”222  He provided far more detail when the House asked
for an update two years later.223  In addition to a copy of the regulations for
compliance, he listed the dates, names, amounts, and purposes of each
expenditure for the years 1820–21, totaling $16,605.80. 224  At that time,
there were “eleven principal schools,” “three subordinate ones, in actual
operation,” and three “in a state of preparation.”225  A handful of the pay-
ments went to U.S. agents, but most went directly to school superintendents
(missionaries), and all of them were for the support of missionary schools
(with the exception of the payments to Rev. Morse for his tour and
report).226
Calhoun also informed the House that some of the payments went to
schools that were within the states rather than “Indian country.”227  He
admitted that this may not comply with “a rigid construction of the rules
adopted for the expenditure of the appropriation,” but concluded that
“there was not a sufficient number of schools in the Indian country, at the
time the allowances were made, to absorb the whole appropriation.” 228  The
school at Cornwall, Connecticut, was well known, led by the influential New
England clergyman Jeremiah Evarts.229  The one at Great Crossings, Ken-
tucky, was under the patronage of Senator and future Vice President Richard
Mentor Johnson and operated by the Baptist Board for Foreign Missions.230
The expenditures within the states did not seem to raise a constitutional eye-
brow.  In 1824 there was a short-lived attempt to officially expand the pro-
gram into the states.231  It was not until 1848, well after removal, that
Congress expressly provided that no funds under the Civilization Act “shall
be expended for any such object elsewhere than in the Indian country.”232
Around the same time, it appears that there may have been some com-
plaints about the program and an effort to shut it down, but their source and
nature are unclear.  From the responses of Calhoun and the missionary socie-
ties that sent memorials to support the program, it would appear that the
222 Id. at 200.
223 See John C. Calhoun, Expenditures for the Civilization of the Indians (Jan. 19,
1822), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 271, 271–74 [herein-
after Calhoun, Expenditures]; see also John C. Calhoun, Condition of the Several Indian
Tribes (Feb. 8, 1822), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 275,
275 [hereinafter Calhoun, Condition].
224 Calhoun, Expenditures, supra note 223, at 273.
225 Calhoun, Condition, supra note 223, at 275.
226 See Calhoun, Expenditures, supra note 223, at 272–73.
227 Id. at 271.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 272–73; JOHN A. ANDREW III, FROM REVIVALS TO REMOVAL: JEREMIAH EVARTS,
THE CHEROKEE NATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA 86–87 (1992).
230 See Calhoun, Expenditures, supra note 223, at 272; see also infra Part III.
231 See 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 124, 130 (1824).
232 Act of July 29, 1848, ch. 118, § 2, 9 Stat. 252, 264.  The statute made it clear the
prohibition did not apply to expenditures pursuant to a treaty. Id.
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concern was about the program’s efficacy, perhaps raised by persons with
designs on tribal lands.233
In 1824, on the motion of Representative Thomas W. Cobb, the House
considered “the expediency” of repealing the Act.234  Along with religious
associations,235 the House Committee on Indian Affairs strongly opposed the
resolution.  It concluded that the “measures which have been adopted for the
disbursement of the annual allowance made by this law” were “very judi-
cious.”236  In five years, the Act had supported three existing missions, the
establishment of eighteen new schools, “more than eight hundred” students,
school houses, and, “in most cases, convenient dwellings for the teachers.”237
At that time, the support was spread among schools operated by ten separate
Christian denominations or benevolent associations.  Three groups had mul-
tiple schools—the American Board, the Baptist General Convention, and the
United Foreign Missionary Society of New York—while seven others, includ-
ing the Catholic Bishop of New Orleans and the Methodist Ohio Conference,
had received or been promised support.238  The Committee further noted
that the partnerships had spurred “[h]undreds of . . . associations” to “collect
donations, with the view of aiding the humane purposes of the Government,”
multiplying the program’s “benefits.”239
The Committee likewise argued that prior efforts to civilize the Natives
had failed because of the mistaken belief that “it was only necessary to send
missionaries among them to instruct them in the Christian religion” without
233 See Calhoun, Condition, supra note 223, at 275; William J. Williams, Civilization of
the Indians (Jan. 28, 1822), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at
274, 274 (“[W]e . . . pray that they will not suffer a plan which has commenced with such
fair prospects of success to be ruined in the morning of its increase; that the Indians may
be saved from the cruel destiny which avarice stands ready to inflict . . . .”); see also James
Monroe, Civilization of the Indians (Feb. 23, 1822), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 325, 325 (responding to a request for an account of the $15,000
appropriate per year under the Act of 1802 “to promote civilization among friendly Indian
tribes”); C.G. Hueffel, Letter from Society of the United Brethren for Propagating the
Gospel Among the Heathen to James Monroe (Sept., 1822), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 372, 372 (responding to request by Senate to account for
the lands granted to the “Christian Indians” under the act of June 1, 1796).
234 Fischbacher, supra note 15, at 57.  Fischbacher also reports a challenge in the Sen-
ate, but does not provide a citation. See id. at 58.
235 Stephen Van Rensselaer, Memorial of the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions (Mar. 3, 1824), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note
165, at 446, 446 (arguing that the program of civilization might divert God’s wrath against
the United States for its multiple “sins” against the tribes).
236 William McLean, Letter from William McLean to the House of Representatives
(Mar. 23, 1824), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 457,
457–58.
237 Id.
238 See John C. Calhoun, Extract of a Letter from the Secretary of War to the Hon. John
McKee, in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 459, 459 [hereinaf-
ter Calhoun, Extract]; see also John C. Calhoun, Civilization of the Indians (Jan. 24, 1824),
in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 443, 443.
239 McLean, supra note 236, at 458.
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adding “the institutes of education and instruction in agriculture” “to their
missionary labors.” 240  By contrast, “[t]hese are combined in the exertions
now making; and, from the good which has been done, the most pleasing
anticipations of success are confidently cherished.”241
The centerpiece of the Committee’s case against repeal was the “almost
universal[ ]” “feeling” of “various denominations of professing Christians . . .
that our Indians may become civilized.”242
It may be said, emphatically, that the passage of this law was called for by a
religious community.  They were convinced of the correctness of the policy
in a political point of view, and, as Christians, they felt the full force of the
obligations which duty enjoined.  Their zeal was tempered by reason.  No
fanciful schemes of proselytism seem to have been indulged.  They formed a
correct estimate of the importance of their undertaking, and pointed to the
most judicious means for the accomplishment of their wishes.  Since the pas-
sage of the law, hundreds and thousands have been encouraged to contrib-
ute their mite in aid of the wise policy of the Government.243
The Committee contrasted this “noble and Christian motive” with “a sec-
tarian zeal,” which “would be less entitled to serious consideration.”244  The
Committee therefore emphasized the program’s political support across all
Christian denominations, distinguishing between the laudable goal of “civili-
zation” and the less “considera[ble]” one of “proselytism.”245
Secretary Calhoun also opposed repealing the Act.  He noted that the
societies had “incurred heavy expenses, under the expectation of a continu-
ance of the aid which they have received from the Government,” and that the
tribes “also have become much interested in these establishments, and
would, no doubt, feel greatly disappointed if they are not continued.”246
Repealing the Act would “be productive of serious loss to these societies, but
of the most injurious effects to our Indian relations.”247  The challenge to
the Act failed.  No one at any point argued that it violated the Constitution or
a nonestablishment norm.
It is important to keep in mind that the funds appropriated by the Civili-
zation Act were a relatively small portion of federal expenses for Indian
affairs.  For instance, in 1823, the fiscal year before the House considered
repealing the Act, the government spent $11,135.33 in civilization funds;248





244 Id. at 458–59.
245 Id. at 458–59.
246 Calhoun, Extract, supra note 238, at 459.
247 Id.
248 It appears that the government usually sent the money to the missionary associa-
tions, which then paid the salaries of missionaries.  Sometimes the government paid the
missionaries directly. See JAMES S. KABALA, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1787–1846, at 20 (2013).
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much for the salaries of agents and subagents.249  By contrast, the govern-
ment spent nearly $80,000 to run the Indian Department and paid over
$180,000 in tribal annuities pursuant to treaty.250
And the federal funds accounted for a small portion of the total money
received by the mission societies for schools.  In 1824, the government paid
$12,708.48 to societies in civilization funds and $8750 in annuities.251  That
year the societies received over $170,000 in private donations, including
donations of property, improvements, and stock.252  Overall, $10,000 was not
a large sum for education during the early republic; a 1795 New York law
appropriated $50,000 per year for five years to cities and towns to support
existing privately run schools.253
Given the relatively small expenditures, one might be tempted to dismiss
any constitutional concern about the government-missionary partnerships as
de minimis.254  Yet even a de minimis use of taxpayer money to support
churches runs contrary to the rationale of those who opposed religious
assessments.  As Madison argued in his influential Memorial and Remonstrance,
“Who does not see . . . that the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one estab-
lishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?”255  The small size of the program does not explain why it did
not attract constitutional complaints.
3. Administering Religion
According to the Act, the President was to allocate funds for schools
where “instruction can be introduced with [the Indians’] own consent.”256
Initially, according to Jedidiah Morse, all of the tribes except the Creeks were
enthusiastic about the program.  The administration did not hesitate, how-
ever, to encourage the nations to receive missionaries.  Sometimes the gov-
ernment heavy-handedly appealed to religious obligation; such pressure
would probably be considered coercive under contemporary doctrine,257
249 John C. Calhoun, Disbursements in the Indian Department (Feb. 21, 1824), in 2
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 443, 443–45.
250 Id. at 445.
251 John Cocke, Condition of the Indians (May 20, 1826), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 667; Thomas L. McKenney, Statement Showing the
Amount Paid by the Government to Missionaries (Apr. 20, 1826), in 2 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 669.
252 Cocke, supra note 251, at 667.
253 See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 46–47 (2012).
254 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 861 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
255 MADISON, supra note 24, 295–306; see infra Part IV.
256 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, § 1, 3 Stat. 516, 516.
257 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
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and would certainly raise concerns about governmental entanglement with
religious organizations.258
One Choctaw chief ran into something of a conflict of interest.  He
hosted the local mission school at his house.  When he began also hosting
booze-fueled parties there, the instructor shuttered the school.259  The mis-
sionary had been seeking treaty funds to expand operations in Choctaw terri-
tory, but informed Superintendent McKenney that it would be best to
allocate the money elsewhere.260
Unwilling to give up on the mission, McKenney appealed to the Choctaw
chiefs that “your great father [the President] has seen with pain that the
doors of the school at [the chief’s house] are shut!  He approves of what the
teacher of that school has done.”261  “It is the doing of the Great Spirit, and
these missionaries are his agents.  Take care how you quarrel with his kind-
ness to you.  He may leave you to yourselves again; and dark and dismal will
be your land, if he does.”262
As the government deployed religious arguments to support the mis-
sions, it expected the missions to propagandize for the government.  In 1828,
McKenney wrote to Reverend Henderson, a Baptist missionary operating an
academy for Choctaw and Creek children, instructing him that
you should especially examine and correct their letters [to their families],
and make them tend to the great objects of the Government, in giving them
a country, a home, and a Government, and laws, &c., &c., on which alone
their very existence depends. . . . You know how to advise them to shape their
course in appealing to the prejudices of their parents.263
Such governmental oversight at least verged on impermissible “entangle-
ment” with religion by today’s doctrinal standards.
D. Removal, Reliance, and the End of the Program
Over the course of the 1820s, enthusiasm for the program cooled.  Some
observers, including McKenney, grew to believe that the task of civilization
was impossible on the frontiers.264  The tribes there faced the age-old
problems of unscrupulous traders and land-greedy whites.  Voluntary
removal, in exchange for land, grew in popularity.
258 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397
U.S. 664 (1970).
259 CYRUS KINGSBURY, MR. KINGSBURY TO THE INDIAN OFFICE (Sep. 28, 1825), H.R. DOC.
NO. 26-109, at 13 (1841).
260 Id.
261 THOMAS MCKENNEY, INDIAN OFFICE TO CHOCTAW CHIEFS (Oct. 21, 1825), H.R. DOC.
NO. 26-109, at 15 (1841) [hereinafter MCKENNEY, CHOCKTAW CHIEFS]; see THOMAS MCKEN-
NEY, INDIAN OFFICE TO MR. HENDERSON (Feb. 7, 1828), H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 34–35
(1841) [hereinafter MCKENNEY, MR. HENDERSON].
262 MCKENNEY, CHOCKTAW CHIEFS, supra note 261, at 15.
263 See MCKENNEY, MR. HENDERSON, supra note 261, at 34–35.
264 VIOLA, supra note 176, at 219; M’KENNEY, supra note 177, at 247.
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In 1826, Secretary of War James Barbour presented a letter to the House
of Representatives framing an argument for removal with a denunciation of
the injustice of the nation’s Indian policy.265  “Missionaries,” he wrote, “are
sent among them to enlighten their minds, by imbuing them with religious
impressions.”266 As a result, “some of them have reclaimed the forest,
planted their orchards, and erected houses, not only for their abode, but for
the administration of justice and for religious worship.”267  Yet “when they
have so done, you send your agent to tell them they must surrender their
country to the white man, and recommit themselves to some new desert, and
substitute, as the means of their subsistence, the precarious chase for the
certainty of cultivation.”268  “They see that our professions are insincere; that
our promises have been broken; that the happiness of the Indian is a cheap
sacrifice to the acquisition of new lands . . . [.]”269  Barbour nevertheless
recommended voluntary removal on generous terms.270  In presenting a
report prepared by McKenney, Barbour later assured Congress that the mis-
sionaries “with but one exception” were “favorable to the removal” so long as
the government continued to “require[ ]” “their labors” and “reimburse[ ]”
“the money they had laid out” for “the erection, by the Government, of
schools west of the Mississippi.”271
Thomas McKenney was disappointed that the Removal Act of 1830 did
not provide more benefits for the relocated Natives.272  He hoped to per-
suade Congress to revise the program, but Jackson removed him from
office.273  The forced removal of the Cherokees later in the decade was, of
course, morally and legally indefensible.  The missionaries, along with the
vast majority of the evangelical community, opposed it, but the Native peo-
ples understandably blamed them along with the government.274
The missionary schools generated less congressional interest in subse-
quent years, but they remained important to the government’s Indian pol-
icy.275  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs’ annual report of 1849 was
265 See James Barbour, Preservation and Civilization of the Indians (Feb. 3, 1826), in 2
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 646, 646–648.
266 Id. at 647.
267 Id. at 647.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 648–49.
271 Thomas McKenney, McKenney to Department of War, Office of Indian Affairs
(Dec. 27, 1826), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 165, at 699, 700.
The exception was Reverend Findley of Ohio. Id.
272 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 21 Stat. 411; see also M’KENNEY, supra note 177, at 160.
273 He believed Jackson removed him because he refused a bribe from Sam Houston,
one of Jackson’s friends. See M’KENNEY, supra note 177, at 30, 206–07, 209.
274 See BERKHOFER, supra note 117, at 102.
275 For a more thorough account of the administration of the civilization funds from
the 1830s to the 1870s, see Fischbacher, supra note 15, at 55–72.
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typical in attributing the “moral and social revolution”276 among the Native
peoples principally to the efforts of “missionary societies of various religious
denominations, and conducted by intelligent and faithful persons of both
sexes, selected with the concurrence of the Department.”277  By them, the
Commissioner noted, “the Indian youth are . . . carefully instructed in the
best of all knowledge, religious truth, their duty towards God and their fellow
beings.”278  The denominational diversity of the missionaries supported by
the fund, if anything, increased over the course of the program.279  Except
for a couple of years in the 1850s when Congress allocated an extra $5000 for
the civilization fund,280  Congress made no other changes to the fund until it
repealed the Civilization Fund Act in 1873.281  The repeal coincided with the
abolition of the treaty system, and thus the end of Indian “independence.”282
E. Postscript on President Grant’s “Peace Policy” and Anti-Sectarianism
The civilization program was not the last of the nineteenth century gov-
ernment-missionary partnerships.  After decades of graft and incompetence
among Indian agents,283 President Grant sought to reform the government’s
Indian relations.284  A central strategy of his “Peace Policy” was to appoint
Christian missionaries, nominated by their denominational associations, to
be the federal agents to the tribes.  In theory, the missionaries would be less
corruptible than their predecessors and more likely to promote peace and
civilization.  Officials made it clear that Christianization was one of the pro-
276 DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 22 (Washington, Gideon & Co. 1849).
277 Id. at 21.
278 Id.; see also id. at 10; DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 3 (Washington, Gideon & Co. 1851); DEP’T. OF
THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS 17 (Washington, A.O.P. Nicholson 1855).
279 See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 28 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1861).
280 See Act of May 5, 1858, ch. 32, 11 Stat. 285; Act of Mar. 3, 1857, ch. 90, 11 Stat. 182.
281 Act of Feb. 14, 1873, ch. 138, 17 Stat. 437, 461; Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 296, 16 Stat.
335, 359.
282 See Fischbacher, supra note 15, at 46, 67.
283 See DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 1 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1865); HENRY E. FRITZ, THE
MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION, 1860–1890, at 27, 40, 76, 79 (1963); Abraham Lin-
coln, Second Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1862), in 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3327, 3333 (James D. Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of
National Literature 1897).
284 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 123–28.
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gram’s goals.285  Legal scholars have given more attention to the Peace Policy
program than to the prior government-missionary partnerships.286
The Peace Policy program deserves a more thorough constitutional anal-
ysis than this Article can provide.287  For now, it is enough to note the Peace
Program’s most glaring novelty: the government used missionaries not only
as teachers and informal emissaries, but also as its exclusive agents to the
Native nations.  The Department selected agents from a pool of candidates
nominated by Christian associations.  Agents had always had a great deal of
authority over the relationship between the tribes and outsiders, including
missionaries.288  But now the agents would also represent the mission associa-
tions.  This predictably led to strife among the participating associations and
complaints about the program, especially where the government appointed
an agent of one denomination to a tribe that had traditionally had a relation-
ship with another denomination (and especially when one was Catholic and
the other Protestant).289  The government ultimately adopted a rule of free-
dom for the missionaries—any group could establish a mission among any
nation.290  This rule was formally neutral, and could, in theory, protect mis-
sionaries (if not the tribes) against the intermeddling of a U.S. missionary-
agent.
Grant’s strategy was short-lived.  The Garfield administration stopped
appointing missionary-agents, and in 1882, President Arthur’s Secretary of
the Interior, H.M. Teller, repudiated the practice.291
What ultimately killed the government’s ad hoc partnership with mission
schools among the tribes was the same thing that ended financial support for
“sectarian” schools across the nation—a groundswell of nativist opposition to
any governmental support for the Catholic Church.292  The National League
for the Protection of American Institutions, which championed federal and
state constitutional amendments prohibiting the funding of religious schools,
specifically targeted the funding of schools among the Native nations.293
285 See id. at 152–56; DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF INDIAN AFFS., SIXTY-SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 6 (Washington, Government
Printing Office 1893); DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 312–13.
286 See, e.g., DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 18, at 100–04; DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at
311–14; Dussias, supra note 29.
287 For a narrative of the program, see BEAVER, supra note 15, at 123–68.
288 See, e.g., BERKHOFER, supra note 117, at 89–91.
289 Id. at 157–61; see BEAVER, supra note 15, at 157–61.
290 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 161 (quoting Secretary of Interior Schurz) (“In future, in
all cases, except where the presence of rival organizations would manifestly be perilous to
peace and order, Indian reservations shall be open to all religious denominations, provid-
ing that no existing treaty stipulations would be violated thereby.” (quoting 77 MISSIONARY
HERALD 129 (1881))).
291 Id. at 151.
292 Id. at 163–68.  For discussion of the anti-Catholic, nativist movement, see, e.g.,
GREEN, supra note 253, at 71–77; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
193–251 (2002).
293 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 166–67.
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The group sent a report to every Protestant denomination showing that in
recent years nearly two-thirds of the missionary-agent funds had gone to sup-
port Catholic schools.294  The Protestant churches withdrew their support for
the program and, though Congress failed to pass the “Blaine Amend-
ment,”295 it did enact a law stating it “to be the settled policy of the Govern-
ment to hereafter make no appropriation whatever for education in any
sectarian school.”296  With the exception of annuity payments according to a
tribe’s direction,297 this put an end to the nineteenth-century’s government-
missionary partnerships.298
In sum, the Civilization Fund Act institutionalized the federal govern-
ment’s partnership with Christian missionaries to educate and assimilate
Native students.  The statute was facially neutral between religion and nonre-
ligion, but it was motivated in part by religion and in practice all the funds
went to Christian missionaries.  No one throughout this period distinguished
between a “religious” or a “secular” purpose or effect for the program.  The
government’s overarching objective was to assimilate Native Americans into
white American political culture, and many officials embraced Christianiza-
tion as a means to that end.
III. THE WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION OF THE PARTNERSHIPS’
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Historians have concluded that no one challenged the constitutionality
of the government-missionary partnerships.299  Yet several episodes under-
score the pervasiveness of the assumption that the partnerships were constitu-
tional, including two that scholars have not noticed.  One involves the only
argument against the constitutionality of the partnerships, the proverbial
exception that proves the rule.
A. The Attempt to Repeal the Civilization Act
As discussed above, a member of Congress proposed repealing the Civili-
zation Fund Act in 1824.300  The records of the proposal are thin, but they
suggest that it was based purely on a belief that the program was not “expedi-
ent.”301  No one argued that it violated constitutional or political norms
against church-state relations.302  In fact, the House Committee on Indian
294 Id. at 167.
295 See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
38 (1992).
296 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 52 (1908) (quoting Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3.,
§ 1, 30 Stat. 62, 79).
297 Id. at 77, 81.
298 BEAVER, supra note 15, at 168.
299 See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 18, at 96–97; DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at
334–35; KABALA, supra note 248, at 22–25.
300 See supra subsection II.C.2.
301 See supra subsection II.C.2.
302 See supra subsection II.C.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 40  8-DEC-20 9:34
716 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
Affairs defended the Act on the ground that it had been “called for” by “a
religious community” out of a “noble and Christian motive,” not “sectarian
zeal.”303 The point, it seems, was that there was widespread political support
for what elite white Americans understood to be a humanitarian as well as a
political project.
B. Richard Mentor Johnson Embraces the Program
Scholars have also noted that Richard Mentor Johnson, who had been
instrumental in defeating a movement to end the Sunday mails on Establish-
ment Clause grounds, appeared to wholeheartedly embrace the Civilization
Fund partnerships.304
In 1829, Senator (later Vice President) Richard Mentor Johnson of Ken-
tucky brought the house down in the Senate with an oration against stopping
the Sunday mail merely because a religious group asked for it.305  Doing so
“would establish the principle, that the Legislature is a proper tribunal to
determine what are the laws of God.” 306  “To prevent a similar train of evils
in this country,” he argued, “the constitution has wisely withheld from our
Government the power of defining the divine law.” 307  Professor David Cur-
rie praised the speech for anticipating “the whole modern understanding of
the establishment clause.”308
Yet Johnson thoroughly embraced the government-missionary partner-
ships.  Beginning as early as 1820, he hosted a missionary school for
Choctaws, other Native students, and local whites on his property at Great
Crossings in Scott County, Kentucky.  The school was originally funded by
the Civilization Fund Act, but was subsequently funded by Choctaw-desig-
nated annuities under the Treaty of Doak’s Stand (1820) and the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek (1825).309  The Choctaw chiefs wanted a school
outside of Indian country, so with the help of the U.S. agent, they agreed to
allow Johnson to host it.
With the War Department’s consent, Johnson engaged Reverend
Thomas Henderson, “under the direction of the Baptist General Conven-
303 See supra subsection II.C.2.
304 See DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 305–07; KABALA, supra note 248, at 19–22.
305 On the nationwide debate about the Sunday mail, see generally Oliver W. Holmes,
Sunday Travel and Sunday Mails: A Question Which Troubled Our Forefathers, 20 N.Y. HIST. 413
(1939); Richard R. John, Taking Sabbatarianism Seriously: The Postal System, the Sabbath, and
the Transformation of American Political Culture, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 517 (1990); James R.
Rohrer, Sunday Mails and the Church-State Theme in Jacksonian America, 7 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
53 (1987).
306 5 REG. DEB. app. at 25 (1829).
307 Id.; Richard M. Johnson, Sunday Mails, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: POST OFFICE
DEPARTMENT 211, 211 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Sea-
ton 1834).
308 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829,
at 327 (2001); id. at 329 (commenting that “[t]here are times when one feels proud to be
an American”).
309 See T. HARTLEY CRAWFORD, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 1–2 (1841).
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tion,”310 to run the school, “a teacher of . . . moral character, a preacher of
the gospel, of industrious habits and dignified manners.”311  Johnson’s plan
was to “have as many white children to be taught with [the Choctaw chil-
dren], to learn them to speak the English language, as well as to learn them
to read, &c.”312  The whole project was closely regulated by the Department
of War.313  The government continued to make payments to support John-
son’s school (the Choctaw Academy) until roughly 1841—more than ten
years after Johnson’s Senate discourse on the Sunday mails.314  Though John-
son was intimately familiar with the prevailing nonestablishment norms of
the day, it apparently never occurred to him that the government-missionary
partnerships might violate them.
C. Jefferson and Madison Critique the Civilization Program
Another episode, unexplored by scholars, underscores the extent to
which even rigorous nonestablishmentarians accepted the constitutionality of
the partnerships.  In February 1822, shortly after he presented his Civilization
Act Report to Secretary Calhoun,315 Reverend Jedediah Morse organized the
“American Society for Promoting the Civilization and General Improvement
of the Indian Tribes within the United States.”316  The Society’s “Constitu-
tion” provided that all retired presidents of the United States would be “ex-
officio” “Patrons of this Society.”317  Morse sent a copy to each of them for
their consent.318
310 THOMAS L. MCKENNEY, INDIAN OFFICE TO MR. HENDERSON, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at
29–30 (1841).
311 RICHARD M. JOHNSON, COLONEL JOHNSON TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT, H.R. DOC. NO.
26-109, at 10 (1841).
312 Id.; see also RICHARD M. JOHNSON, COLONEL JOHNSON TO THE INDIAN OFFICE, H.R.
DOC. NO. 26-109, at 19 (1841).
313 See H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 21–24 (1841); see also THOMAS L. MCKENNEY, INDIAN
OFFICE TO MR. HENDERSON, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 27–28 (1841); see THOMAS L. MCKEN-
NEY, INDIAN OFFICE TO MR. HENDERSON, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 35–36 (1841); LEWIS
CASS, DEPARTMENT OF WAR TO REV. THOMAS HENDERSON, H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 55
(1841).
314 See H.R. DOC. NO. 26-109, at 175–79 (1841).
315 See supra subsection II.C.1.
316 See To James Madison from Jedidiah Morse, 16 February 1822, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE, at nn.1, 3 (Jedidiah Morse) https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/
04-02-02-0402 (last visited Sep. 9, 2020).
317 Id. at n.2 (quoting THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PRO-
MOTING THE CIVILIZATION AND GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRIBES IN THE UNITED
STATES 4 (New Haven, S. Converse 1824)).
318 See id.; From John Adams to Jedidiah Morse, 2 March 1822, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE [hereinafter Adams to Morse] (John Adams), https://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Adams/99-02-02-7601 (last visited Sept. 6, 2020); To James Madison from Thomas Jef-
ferson, 25 February 1822, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE [hereinafter Jefferson to Madison]
(Thomas Jefferson), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0406
(last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
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Jefferson and Adams both declined for the same reason: the Society
would mimic the government without having its authority, and would proba-
bly get in the government’s way.319  As Jefferson explained to Madison, the
Society would
comprehend all the functionaries of the government executive, legislative &
Judiciary, all officers of the army or navy, governors of the states, learned
institutions, the whole body of the clergy who will be 19/20 of the whole
association, and as many other individuals as can be enlisted for 5.D. apiece.
For what object?  One which the government is pursuing with superior
means, superior wisdom, and under limits of legal prescription.320
While Jefferson showed his well-known bias against the clergy, his objec-
tion had nothing to do with nonestablishment norms.  He rather thought the
whole scheme to be “presumptuous & of dangerous example” because it pro-
posed to do the government’s job.321  Adams felt the same.322  Their objec-
tions likely had more to do with a concern about an “imperia in imperio,” or a
private organization aping governmental sovereignty, than one about
nonestablishment.323
Madison was less hyperbolic.  He accepted the “honorary relation” out of
his “esteem[ ]” for “the objects of the Institution,” namely, the assimilation of
the tribes.324  He also explained to Jefferson why he thought it harmless to
accept the honorary title.  The whole project, he believed, was doomed; the
proposed Society was too large and its members would have “repulsive,” or
contrary, ambitions.325  Madison was right: the Society dissolved within two
years.326
In sum, the episode confirms that Jefferson and Madison, the two most
influential spokesmen for what modern scholars would call a strict separation
of church and state, saw no constitutional problem with the government-mis-
sionary partnerships.  In office, they personally supported ad hoc partner-
319 See Adams to Morse, supra note 318; Jefferson to Madison, supra note 318.
320 Jefferson to Madison, supra note 318.
321 Id.
322 See Adams to Morse, supra note 318 (“The President, Senate, & <Heads> House of
Representatives, are the Constituted Authorities for conducting all our Foreign relations,
And their power and means are fully adequate to the service.”).
323 See Kellen Funk, Church Corporations and the Conflict of Laws in Antebellum America, 32
J.L. & RELIGION 263, 269 (2017) (“[M]any American commentators saw all religious
groups—not just Roman Catholics—as chief rivals to republican sovereignty.”); Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of Empire in New York,
1750–1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319, 34041 (1998).
324 From James Madison to Jedidiah Morse, 26 February 1822, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (James Madison), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-
0408 (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
325 From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 5 March 1822, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (James Madison), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-
0410 (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
326 See PHILLIPS, supra note 164, at 212–13.
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ships, and in private they preferred the Civilization Fund program to a purely
private endeavor to coordinate missions to the Native Americans.
D. An Intriguing Challenge in Congress
Scholars have overlooked the only episode, to my knowledge, which may
plausibly be construed as an Establishment Clause challenge to the Civiliza-
tion Fund program.  The challenge fizzled, proving the rule that officials
widely assumed the partnerships were constitutional.
On February 8, 1822, “Mr. Baldwin presented a petition of a Missionary
Society of Pennsylvania,” asking for land near “each principal Indian settle-
ment.”327  The goal was “to aid the object of extending the knowledge of the
christian religion, and the arts of civilized life among the Indians.”328  After a
complaint about the potential “increase” in the “expenses of the Indian
Department,” a Mr. Wright of Maryland lodged an extensive objection, con-
voluting religious, policy, and constitutional grounds.329
Wright’s religious argument was that “[t]he God who created those Indi-
ans” “had inscribed on their hearts his law.”330  Relying on scripture, he
maintained that “[i]t would be a libel on the Creator to say that he had
exacted from his creatures an obedience to his law without inscribing his law
on their hearts.”331  Proselytization, on this view, is contrary to God’s will
because it presumes that God has not provided each person with natural
access to religious truth.  To support this assertion, Wright argued that “those
people [the Native Americans] are as religious; that they worship with as
much ardor and zeal the great unknown Spirit, as any other sect
whatever.”332  This led to his policy point: “[W]e do no good by converting
them from their faith, because we unhinge their principles at the same
time.”333  Proselytization is neither necessary, nor humanitarian, nor, in the
end, effective.  Indeed, Wright suspected that “[t]hese missionaries, sent
among the Indians, . . . were little better than spies among them to learn how
to cheat them.”334  Wright was the genuine humanitarian.
Wright wrapped his religious and policy arguments in proto-nonestab-
lishment concerns.  He “protested, totis viribus, against any legislation” “con-
nected with religion.”335  Indeed, “[a]ny measures taken by this government
to change their [the Native Americans’] religion, would be in the teeth of the
327 Seventeenth Congress, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), Feb. 9, 1822, at 2.
328 Id.
329 Id.  This appears to be Robert Wright, who served as a member of the Seventeenth
Congress, March 4, 1821, to March 3, 1823.  He was not a member of Congress when it
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Constitution.”336  The government “might as well” send missionaries “into
Maryland, or any other State, to convert the people, as among the Indians—
Congress having as much right to regulate the religion of the one as of the
other.”337  His argument boils down to the view that the Constitution gives
Congress no authority over matters touching religion.
Wright’s argument generated no debate.  Baldwin, who had submitted
the Missionary Society’s petition, “declined entering into this sort of discus-
sion,” and the House referred the petition to the Committee on Indian
Affairs.338  There the historical trail ends.
Wright’s objection was not to the Civilization Fund program, but it
might as well have been—all of his arguments apply with equal force to
directly funding missionaries.339  Several aspects of his arguments are worth
noting.  On the surface, they depended on notions of religious sociology that
sound modern, but were buttressed by somewhat heterodox Christian argu-
ments.  Though unusual for his day, Wright’s opinions illustrate the perva-
siveness of the assumption that reasoning about public policy should, or at
least could, proceed from Christian premises.  Yet Wright’s constitutional
arguments were quite aside from his religious and policy points.  Wright was
not alone in thinking that the Constitution gave the federal government no
power over religion—this had been a refrain of those who promoted ratifica-
tion, and many probably understood the Establishment Clause to entrench
that commitment.340
In the end, the most important aspect of Wright’s argument was that no
one agreed.  No one else opposed federal support for missionaries on the
ground that the Constitution did not give Congress power over religion.  The
other members of the House did not even dignify his argument with a
rebuttal.
IV. A SHORT HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS DISESTABLISHMENT
Why didn’t the government-missionary partnerships catalyze an Estab-
lishment Clause objection?  According to one scholar, the partnerships were
the “one major exception to the general rule that church-state issues inevita-




339 President Madison vetoed a land grant to “the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting-
house, in the Mississippi Territory” in 1811, on the ground that the grant “comprise[d] a
principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the use
and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares
that Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.”  11 ANNALS OF
CONG. 366 (1811); see also James Madison, To the Baptist Churches on Neal’s Creek and on
Black Creek, North Carolina, in 2 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 511–12
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
340 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 292, at 105–07, 106 n.40.
341 DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 334.
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norms were initially forged in debates over the propriety of assessing taxpay-
ers to support churches and clergy—a policy strikingly similar to federally
funded missions.
This Part begins the inquiry by providing a brief history of American
disestablishment.  The next Part situates the partnerships within that history.
During the era of the government-missionary partnerships, America was
undergoing a renegotiation of the relationship between religion and govern-
ment.  The Establishment Clause was only one artifact of that renegotiation;
most of the disputes over religious disestablishment through the nineteenth
century arose in the states,342 most of which had inherited various institu-
tional and legal attributes of religious establishment from the colonial era.343
The Establishment Clause itself was relatively uncontroversial.344  Its
drafting and ratification generated little discussion.345  This lack of contro-
versy was likely due to widespread agreement about the provision’s core
meaning.  Scholars have poured over historical materials to reconstruct this
meaning; their best efforts, in my view, suggest that Americans largely under-
stood the Clause to prohibit a national religion.346  Some may have also
understood the Clause to make it clear that the federal government was pro-
hibited from interfering with a state religious establishment.347
The First Amendment drafters and ratifiers had plenty of experience
with a religious establishment: England had one, many of the colonies had
had one, and many states continued to have one into the nineteenth century.
As Michael McConnell has argued, Americans would have understood six
342 Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Estab-
lishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 50 (1991) (arguing that “the battle over disestablish-
ment in the states” was one of “two great defining controversies” of the religion clauses,
along with “the long Protestant-Catholic conflict in the wake of the Reformation”).
343 See Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment
Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 493. See generally GREEN, supra note 253, at
45–92 (discussing the development of the no-funding norm in 1820s–40s); HAMBURGER,
supra note 292, at 219–29 (same); KABALA, supra note 248 (devoting only one chapter to
the federal government); Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on
Church Power and Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014) (exploring state
limits on church property).
344 DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 327.
345 For a thorough review of the historical evidence, see Esbeck, supra note 343, at
525–96.
346 See, e.g., DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 329–30; Esbeck, supra note 343, at 494–95.
347 Some scholars have argued that the Clause’s exclusive or principal point was to
reinforce federalism, a reading which makes incorporating it against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment potentially anachronistic (unless Americans understood the
Clause differently in 1868 than they did at the Founding). See supra note 126.  While some
Americans probably believed the Clause would be useful as an extratextual argument
against national interference with a state religious establishment, the historical evidence
strongly supports the conclusion that Americans understood the Clause to prohibit the
federal government from establishing a national church like the Church of England. See
DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 329–30 (rejecting federalist reading); Esbeck, supra note 343,
at 494 (same).
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practices to be hallmarks of an “establishment of religion”: government con-
trol over the doctrines, structure, and personnel of a state church;348
mandatory attendance at religious worship services in the state church;349
government financial support for religion in the form of land grants and
religious taxes;350 prohibition of worship in nonestablished churches;351 the
use of the state church for civil functions;352 and the condition of political
participation on membership in the established church.353  If the Establish-
ment Clause did nothing more than clarify for concerned Antifederalists that
the federal government had no authority to institute these legal require-
ments and practices, or to interfere with state establishments, its function was
significant.354
Despite this core meaning, the outer bounds of a law “respecting an
establishment of religion” was from the beginning somewhat “vague.”355
Some officials believed that nonestablishment of religion prohibited more
than the foregoing hallmarks of the English establishment.  Americans in the
early republic and throughout the nineteenth century developed and
deployed an idiom356 of disestablishment interconnected with concepts such
as liberty of conscience,357 the threat of imperium in imperio,358 and the sepa-
ration of church and state.359  Most of these concepts developed in argu-
ments about the propriety of certain practices at the state level, but there
were notable disputes about federal practices, too, such as presidential proc-
348 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–44 (2003).
349 Id. at 2144–46.
350 Id. at 2146–59.
351 Id. at 2159–69.
352 Id. at 2169–76.
353 Id. at 2176–81.
354 Contra DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 331–32 (implying that the Clause’s lack of con-
troversy suggests that Americans did not expect it to accomplish much).
355 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080
(2019) (“While the concept of a formally established church is straightforward, pinning
down the meaning of a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion’ has proved to be a
vexing problem.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 411, 419 (2013) (discussing textual vagueness); Esbeck, supra note 343, at 495–96
(“[W]ithin a modest range, the word ‘establishment’ meant different things to different
figures at the political center of the formative law-making process.”).
356 On the notion of an “idiom” as a normative language for political dispute, see J.G.A.
POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY,
CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 7–10 (1985); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, at xi (1978); Mark A. Noll, British Methodological Pointers
for Writing a History of Theology in America, in SEEING THINGS THEIR WAY: INTELLECTUAL HIS-
TORY AND THE RETURN OF RELIGION 202, 203–06 (Alister Chapman, John Coffey & Brad S.
Gregory eds., 2009).
357 See Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1457, 1464–71.
358 See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
359 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 292.
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lamations of days of prayer,360 legislative prayer,361 and especially the Sunday
mail.362  All of these debates contributed to the development of norms of
disestablishment, some of which became embodied in state and federal law—
especially through state constitutional amendments prohibiting the funding
of religious education.363  Thus the periphery of nonestablishment norms
included objections to a variety of relationships between government and
religion, some of them new to the American constitutional situation, others
holdovers from the colonial era.  Some of those issues, especially the propri-
ety of religious instruction in publicly funded schools, evolved significantly
during the period of the federal-missionary partnerships.364
The government’s funding of missions to the Native nations is most
closely analogous to two practices that generated disestablishment objections
at different times and places within the early republic.  The first were relig-
ious assessments.  As discussed briefly above, several states inherited the colo-
nial practice of assessing all taxpayers a flat amount to support a local church
or clergy member.  The details of religious assessment programs differed by
state.  Some states allowed the taxpayer to choose which denomination would
receive the assessment.  Yet even when taxpayers could choose the church
that would receive the proceeds of their taxes, the assessments still amounted
to government-forced tithes.
In 1886, Virginia evangelicals, led by Madison and Jefferson, famously
defeated a proposed assessment bill.  The Supreme Court has elevated this
episode to the “defining event of disestablishment”365 and some judges and
scholars argue that assessments reflect “the paradigm case” of what the
Founding generation understood the Establishment Clause to forbid.366
Yet there was another practice that bears a resemblance to the govern-
ment-missionary partnerships: government-funded elementary education.367
In the earliest days of the constitutional republic, most schools were funded
by parents368 and virtually all of them included not only Bible reading but
360 See Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 561 (Elizabeth Fleet ed.,
1946); From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, 23 January 1808, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Thomas Jefferson), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-
02-7257 (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (arguing that the Constitution prohibits the president
from recommending a public day of fasting).
361 See Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” supra note 360, at 558–59; see also KABALA, supra
note 248, at 168–78 (focusing on the 1833 dispute in New York).
362 See generally Holmes, supra note 305; John, supra note 305; Rohrer, supra note 305.
363 See GREEN, supra note 253, at 53–71.
364 See generally id.
365 McConnell, supra note 348, at 2156; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–12
(1947).
366 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
367 See generally CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860 (Eric Foner ed., 1983).
368 See CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMERICAN MODEL OF STATE AND SCHOOL: AN HISTORICAL
INQUIRY 86–87 (2012).
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religious instruction.369  Early in the nineteenth century, states began to sub-
sidize existing schools, many of them denominational.370  Many Protestants
united around the “common school” movement that shifted most of the
state’s education resources into schools that taught the basics of Protestant
doctrine and morality.371
By the 1830s–40s, Americans began to dispute the propriety of funding
religious education.  In some states, Protestants supported the government
funding of “nonsectarian” schools that taught basic Christian principles but
objected to government funding of denominational schools.372  Motivated in
large part by nativism and anti-Catholicism,373 Protestants hoped common
schools would enculturate Catholic immigrants.374  Catholics sought govern-
ment funding for their schools because the publicly funded “nonsectarian”
schools were essentially Protestant.375  Some places, such as New York City,
funded Catholic schools too.376  The Protestant-generated “no-funding” prin-
ciple gained steam through the nineteenth century, culminating in state con-
stitutional prohibitions on funding sectarian institutions.377  Yet Bible
reading and generic Christian instruction persisted in many public schools
into the twentieth century.378  And, as discussed above, no one challenged
the religious character of the government-missionary partnerships.
V. THE MISSIONARY PARTNERSHIPS AS GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT FOR
EDUCATION
Where do the government-missionary partnerships fit into the historical
development of nonestablishment norms?  Were they essentially religious
assessments that went uncontested?  If so, why didn’t anyone contest them?
Or were they more like elementary schools funded by the states and the Dis-
trict?  Although overlapping reasons may account for why U.S. officials did
not challenge the partnerships’ constitutionality, the main reason was a
369 Id. at 68–70.
370 See id. at 92–94, 113.
371 See id. at 69–70 (discussing religion in the common schools); id. at 85 (discussing
success of the common schools); Timothy L. Smith, Protestant Schooling and American
Nationality, 1800–1850, 53 J. AM. HIST. 679 (1967).
372 See GLENN, supra note 368, at 104–07.
373 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 253, at 71–77; HAMBURGER, supra note 292, at 191–92.
374 See GLENN, supra note 368, at 112–14, 121.
375 See GREEN, supra note 253, at 54–68.
376 See GLENN, supra note 368, at 94.
377 See GREEN, supra note 253, at 69–71; Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine
Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003).
378 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that
school-sponsored Bible reading is unconstitutional); Comment, Reading the Bible in Common
Schools, 12 YALE L.J. 102 (1902). But see R. Laurence Moore, Bible Reading and Nonsectarian
Schooling: The Failure of Religious Instruction in Nineteenth-Century Public Education, 86 J. AM.
HIST. 1581 (2000) (arguing that Bible reading in nonsectarian schools during the nine-
teenth century was far from universal and was considered a separate matter from religious
instruction in general).
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widely held paradigm of social progress that required education and at least a
modicum of Christianization to facilitate republicanism.
A. “Indian Affairs” Exceptionalism
Perhaps U.S. officials did not challenge the constitutionality of the gov-
ernment-missionary partnerships because of some combination of factors
related to “‘Indian affairs’—a catch-all analog of ‘foreign affairs’ that encom-
passed treatymaking, land title, trade, and war and peace with Native
nations.”379  In particular, Indian affairs involved several aspects of federal
power that raised (and continue to raise) questions about the Constitution’s
scope.
The scope of federal jurisdiction over Native peoples and Indian country
was unclear.  A handful of Native nations were considered tributaries of the
states in which they were located; their members were taxpayers absorbed
into the body of state citizens.  What distinguished them from others within
the state was their racial and cultural identity.  Most of the larger Native
nations, however, lived in Indian country within a state or federal territory.
The early administrations maintained that these nations were sovereigns
independent of the states and foreign states but dependent on the United
States.380  The Supreme Court subsequently articulated the same doc-
trine.381  The result was that states exercised no jurisdiction within Indian
country, and the federal government exercised limited legislative and judicial
jurisdiction under the Indian Commerce Clause and pursuant to treaties.382
Native nations, for their part, insisted on sovereignty within their territories,
whether they were within a state or federal territory.383
Furthermore, it was unclear whether the Bill of Rights even applied with
full force in federal territories.384  The Northwest Ordinance included provi-
sions like those in the Bill of Rights, but, notably, not an Establishment
379 Ablavsky, supra note 27, at 1004; see DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 18, at 107 (argu-
ing that officials did not think the Bill of Rights applied to Indian affairs).
380 Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1064–65; see Thomas Jefferson, Notes for a Conversation
with George Hammand (Dec. 10, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 717, 717
(John Catanzariti ed., 1990).
381 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see Ablavsky, supra note
30, at 611–12.
382 See FORD, supra note 68, at 32, 60, 90.
383 Ablavsky, supra note 30, at 594 (“Both Native nations and the United States, then,
were engaged in a similar intellectual project of extrapolating Eurocentric legal rules to
North America’s borderlands.”).
384 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Northwest Ordi-
nance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1637–38 (2019); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1200–01 (1996). See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION
FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Clause.385  Instead, it provided that “Religion, Morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, Schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”386  Perhaps the gov-
ernment-missionary partnerships to Native nations within the Northwest Ter-
ritory reflected Congress’s belief that it could act as a state legislature in the
territories, unbound by the Establishment Clause.387  Yet this would not
account for the partnerships to Native groups who resided within the states.
Native peoples likewise did not enjoy the full legal privileges of white
Americans.388  The federal government only counted the members of the
“tributary tribes” for purposes of apportionment and taxes.389  Into the early
republic, state law permitted whites to hold Native Americans alongside Afri-
can Americans as slaves.390  In addition, the federal government restricted
naturalization to “free white person[s] . . . of good character.”391  U.S. citi-
zenship became a carrot for treaty negotiations.392  Some questioned
whether noncitizens, within the states or not, enjoyed any constitutional
rights.393  Native Americans were quasi-foreigners living on quasi-foreign ter-
ritory; perhaps the Establishment Clause was not understood to reach the
government’s relationship with them.
The legal status of Native Americans was bound up with white percep-
tions of race.  Racial opinions varied during the early republic and changed
over time.394  After the Revolution, many white elites probably agreed with
Thomas Jefferson that Native Americans were naturally the equal of whites,
but their culture, laws, morality, and religion were inferior to those of white
385 See, e.g., An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
North West of the River Ohio art. I, 32 J. CONT’L CONG. 334, 340 (U.S. Gov’t Printing
Office 1936) (1787).
386 Id. art. III.
387 See SMITH, supra note 126, at 28; Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1121–23 (1998).
388 Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitu-
tional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025, 1059 (2018) (“[L]egal belonging was explicitly con-
ditioned on would-be citizens’ membership in dominant racial, ethnic, and gender
categories.”).
389 Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1054–55; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excepting “Indi-
ans not taxed” from the “their respective Numbers” of the states relevant for taxation and
apportionment); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (exempting tribes
that were “members of any of the states” from federal control).
390 Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native
Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1459–60
(2011).
391 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103; see Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2
Stat. 153, 153 (replacing 1790 law but retaining the “free white” requirement).
392 See FORD, supra note 68, at 146–47.
393 Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927–43 (1991).
394 See SILVER, supra note 44, at xx–xxi; Ablavsky, supra note 388, at 1066; Alden T.
Vaughan, From White Man to Redskin: Changing Anglo-American Perceptions of the American
Indian, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 917, 919 (1982).
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American society.395  This was the class of white Americans—government
officials, national politicians, clergy, and publishers—that paternalistically
“spoke of their duty to help people of color complete their journey toward
‘civilized’ status.”396  Other whites, especially settlers who had been involved
with war against Native nations,397 were more hostile to Native Americans
and increasingly opposed to their assertions of territorial sovereignty.398
These sentiments hardened and spread after the War of 1812 with the rise of
Jacksonian politics and pseudoscientific ideologies of race.399  Even elite
whites preferred policies of racial segregation—even between whites and eth-
nic Native Americans that had completely assimilated to white culture.400
Perhaps whites simply could not imagine that Native Americans could have
the same rights they enjoyed.
Any of these territorial or personal aspects of Indian affairs may have
accounted for why no one objected to the government-missionary partner-
ships.  But the historical evidence complicates this conclusion.  First, no one
suggested that the partnerships would have been unconstitutional had they
been done elsewhere or with other people.  The scant evidence that anyone
even considered the constitutionality of the government-missionary partner-
ships suggests the opposite: that it was at least imaginable that the Establish-
ment Clause forbade the government from interfering with Native religious
liberty.401
Second, the Indian affairs objections are an ill fit for the evidence.
Some of the mission schools, including the one Senator Johnson hosted on
his land in Kentucky, were within the “ordinary jurisdiction”402 of a state.403
Some had white as well as Native American students.404  Most of the schools
were within Indian country, and the vast majority of the students were Native
American, but no one suggested the program’s constitutionality turned on
location, legal status, or race.
Third, the conclusion that there was an extraterritorial or noncitizen
exception to the Establishment Clause is premised on a debatable presump-
tion that the Establishment Clause exclusively, or principally, operates to pro-
395 NICHOLAS GUYATT, BIND US APART: HOW ENLIGHTENED AMERICANS INVENTED RACIAL
SEGREGATION 7–8 (2016).
396 Id.
397 SILVER, supra note 44, at xix.
398 See FORD, supra note 68, at 188–96.
399 See id.; Vaughan, supra note 394, at 953.
400 See GUYATT, supra note 395, at 29; see also DAVID J. SILVERMAN, RED BRETHREN: THE
BROTHERTOWN AND STOCKBRIDGE INDIANS AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE IN EARLY AMERICA 7
(2010).
401 See supra Section III.D.  As discussed above, the House of Representatives apparently
did not deem the allegation worthy of response, but the evidence does not suggest why.
402 See FORD, supra note 68, at 32, 34.
403 See supra Section III.B.
404 See supra Section I.A (Wheelock school in Connecticut).
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tect individual rights, rather than as a structural restraint.405  There is no
question that white Americans during the early republic debated the extent
to which noncitizens were entitled to constitutional rights.406  But the Estab-
lishment Clause in many respects protected individual religious liberty by
restraining the government from entering into particular relationships with
religious associations, such as controlling religious doctrine and personnel,
providing land grants and funds directly to churches, and using a state
church for civil functions.407  It is unclear that such a structural restraint
would have been understood to be inapplicable to government based on
location or personhood.408  Indeed, in 1811, President Madison vetoed bills
that would have supported churches in the District of Columbia and the Mis-
sissippi Territory on the ground that the support would violate the Establish-
ment Clause.409
Fourth, virtually every state and the District of Columbia funded elemen-
tary schools that incorporated prayers, Bible reading, or Christian cateche-
sis.410  Furthermore, the Reconstruction Congress partnered with
missionaries to educate the freedmen.411  Something more global than
Indian affairs exceptionalism accounts for the presumed constitutionality of
the federal-missionary partnerships.
B. A Pre-Secular Paradigm of Social Progress
The most straightforward reading of the evidence is that Americans,
from the early republic through the antebellum era, simply assumed that the
Constitution permitted government funding of religious instruction as part
of a comprehensive education.  This consensus was not the product of con-
405 See AMAR, supra note 126, at 20–21; Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1998).
406 Neuman, supra note 393, at 927–43 (providing a typology of constitutional argu-
ments); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789–1801, at 254–60 (1997) (analyzing the Alien Act debate). See generally Philip
Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823 (2009).
407 See supra Part IV.
408 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 169 (2007)
(discussing Article I, Section 9’s prohibition on drawing money from the treasury “but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” as a limit on the power of the President and
Senate to create binding domestic law through treaty (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7)).
409 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 351 (1811) (vetoing a bill to incorporate an Episcopal church
in the District of Columbia); 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 366 (1811) (vetoing a bill to give land to
a Baptist Church in the Mississippi Territory).
410 GLENN, supra note 368, at 92–96; id. at 89 (discussing the District of Columbia); see
also LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 4–9
(1987); KAESTLE, supra note 367, at 57, 166–67.
411 See ROBERT C. MORRIS, READING, ’RITING, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE EDUCATION OF
FREEDMEN IN THE SOUTH, 1861–1870, at 3, 49–59 (1981); JOE. M. RICHARDSON, CHRISTIAN
RECONSTRUCTION: THE AMERICAN MISSIONARY ASSOCIATION AND SOUTHERN BLACKS,
1861–1890, at 4, 41–46, 75–83 (1986).
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sidered judgment, public debate, or express principle; it was the result of a
widely shared “social imaginary”412 of “civilization” that understood educa-
tion, republicanism, and Christianization to be interdependent and mutually
reinforcing.413  Anglo-Americans tacitly assumed this intellectual framework
for evaluating social progress.414  It would not have crossed their minds to
have pursued a program of benevolence toward Native peoples that was not
aimed at “civilization,” nor to use any means other than education and
Christianization.
Three facets of this social imaginary contributed to widespread agree-
ment on the propriety of the federal government’s civilization program: the
relationship between religion and republicanism; the pervasive acceptance of
Christian morality; and the imagining of Native Americans as “savages.”
1. Christianity and American Republicanism
Elite white Americans differed on the specifics of politics and religion,
but throughout the early republic they agreed that “the health of a republic
required the exercise of virtue by its citizens.”415  While republicanism and
religion had been somewhat opposed in English and continental political
discourse, “[i]n the thirteen colonies that became the United States, republi-
can and Protestant convictions merged as they did nowhere else in the
world.”416  As a result, “[b]y the early decades of the nineteenth century, it
had become a matter of routine for American believers of many types to
speak of Christian and republican values with a single voice.”417  A broad
commitment to the development of “virtue,” as a general matter, allowed
elite white Americans to embrace and merge “several not altogether compati-
ble ideals,” such as classical Machiavellianism, biblical piety, and a more
412 TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 146, 172–74.  A social imaginary is something like a “para-
digm” for social engagement. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962).
413 The canonical study of American “civilization” is CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R.
BEARD, THE AMERICAN SPIRIT (1942).  For discussions of the notion of civilization in the
early republic and through the Second Great Awakening, see id. at 98–276; PRUCHA, supra
note 15, at 146; TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 455–56. See generally RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON,
LAND OF SAVAGERY, LAND OF PROMISE: THE EUROPEAN IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1981); BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION: JEFFERSO-
NIAN PHILANTHROPY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1973).
414 Influenced by the French Enlightenment, a handful of antebellum Americans main-
tained that Christianity was not a prerequisite for a proper education and experimented
with nonreligious education or utopian communities. See, e.g., Samuel Harrison Smith,
Remarks on Education, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 167, 170, 211 (Fred-
erick Rudolph ed., 1965). See generally GLENN, supra note 368, at 52–53.  These ideas were
“too radical and too comprehensive for most people.”  Carl F. Kaestle, Ideology and American
Educational History, 22 HIST. EDUC. Q. 123, 134 (1982).
415 NOLL, supra note 160, at 90.
416 Id. at 73.
417 Id.
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“gendered” understanding of virtue as “the ethics of female, domestic, pri-
vate morality.”418
Such Americans “agreed that vibrant religion is necessary for the survival
of the social order—and ultimately—representative democracy.”419  Con-
sider the sentiments of John Adams:
One great Advantage of the Christian Religion is that it brings the great
Principle of the Law of Nature and Nations, Love your neighbour as your-
self, and do to others as you would that others should do to you, to the
Knowledge, Belief, and Veneration of the whole People. . . . No other Insti-
tution for Education, no kind of political Discipline, could diffuse this kind
of necessary Information, so universally among all Ranks and Descriptions of
Citizens.420
Examples of such sentiments among the reading class from the Found-
ing era through the mid-nineteenth century could be multiplied ad infin-
itum.421  The unique American merger of Christianity and republicanism,
not only in theory but in ardent political and religious practice, was one of
the overriding themes of Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of American politics in
the 1830s.422
One implication of this commitment, as the Adams quote suggests, was
that the diffusion of Christian morality among the people was necessary for
the republic’s success as a political project.  Religious morality, through edu-
cation, was thus a sine qua non of the development and advance of this con-
ception of American civilization.
2. Natural Versus Revealed Religion
Within this social imaginary, Americans often disagreed about whether
an education in “revealed” religion, as opposed to “natural” religion, was nec-
essary.  The distinction was important, but it elides the fundamental unity of
the overarching social imaginary’s assumption that Christian morality was
essential to republicanism.
418 Id. at 90.
419 WEST, supra note 119, at 15.
420 Id. at 51 (quoting John Adams, August 14, 1796, Sunday, in DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF JOHN ADAMS 240–41 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1964) (diary entry)).
421 See, e.g., id. at 27 (“[V]irtue and piety are inseparably connected . . . [and] to pro-
mote true religion is the best and most effectual way of making a virtuous and regular
people.” (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN WITHERSPOON, AN ANNOTATED EDITION OF
LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 159 (Jack Scott ed., 1982) (Lecture XIV))); id. at 44
(discussing Wilson’s view); Washington, supra note 89 (“[R]eason and experience both
forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”).
422 See 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 31, at 476 (“Americans mix Christianity and liberty so
completely in their mind that it is nearly impossible to make them conceive one without
the other; and, among them, this is not one of those sterile beliefs that the past bequeaths
to the present and that seem more to vegetate deep in the soul than to live.”); see also
NOLL, supra note 160, at 53–92.
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The language of natural and revealed religion (and natural and revealed
morality) was suffused throughout the early republic.  In theory, natural
religion or morality amounted to the requirements of morality that one
could comprehend through the use of reason alone.  “Revealed” religion or
morality included those demands of ethics that one could comprehend only
through revelation, principally the Christian scriptures.
Complicating this distinction was the fact that “[e]vangelicals such as
[John] Witherspoon and [John] Jay, no less than champions of the Enlight-
enment such as [Thomas] Jefferson and [Benjamin] Franklin, concurred
that the morality of revelation is largely coincident with the morality of rea-
son and conscience.”423  Consider again John Adams: Christianity uniquely
“brings the great Principle of the Law of Nature and Nations, Love your
neighbour as yourself, and do to others as you would that others should do to
you, to the Knowledge, Belief, and Veneration of the whole People.”424  For
Adams, whatever may have been revealed in Christianity was simply a peda-
gogical supplement to the natural faculties of reason and conscience.  In the
vein of Thomas Hobbes, then, many Americans believed the doctrines of
Christianity, whatever their accuracy about supernatural affairs, to be useful
for fostering the public morality necessary to sustain a republic.  As the
exchange between Colonel Pickering and Reverend Kirkland shows, Ameri-
cans disagreed about the utility of introducing students to revealed religion.
Yet such differences of opinion raised no nonestablishment concerns—at
least with regard to the education of Native Americans.425
3. Civilization and “Savages”
Benjamin Franklin referred to frontier settlers as “Christian white
savages.”426  The phrase perfectly captures the racial and cultural ambiguity
of the elite white American conception of civilization during the early repub-
lic.  Whites could be savages, outside the bounds of civilization, for lack of
education and republican virtue—even when they were “Christian.”  Like-
wise, most elite whites believed that Native Americans were “by nature equal
to the white man”427 and could assimilate to white culture through educa-
tion.428  But even “Christian white savages” were distinguished by race, just as
423 WEST, supra note 119, at 75.
424 Id. at 51 (quoting Adams, supra note 420).
425 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1971). But see Richard W. Gar-
nett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1670 (2006); Michael W.
McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1254
(2000).
426 NICHOLS, supra note 96, at 13 (quoting EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 131
(2002)).
427 PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 136.
428 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 62–69 (Richmond, J.W.
Randolph 1853); SHEEHAN, supra note 413, at 6 (“Although the years from the Revolution
to removal produced ample diversity in politics and ideology, on the question of the
Indian and his relationship to civilization they were substantially Jeffersonian.”); see also
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Native Americans, so long as they remained “Indian,” were not entirely
within the pale of civilization.  The border between whites and nonwhites
may have been somewhat permeable, but nevertheless served as a default for
social ordering.429  Civilization was defined in part by what it was not, and for
most Euro-Americans, its antithesis was epitomized by Native American folk-
ways and religion.430
A distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples, inherited
from medieval and early modern law in the West, influenced the law of
nations into the late eighteenth century.431  Over time the distinction
evolved into one between civilized and uncivilized nations.  Civilized nations
were bound to deal with others according to the law of nations but could
disregard that law when dealing with groups that were uncivilized or that
violated the law of war.432  According to Emer de Vattel, the Swiss treatise
writer who most influenced U.S. statesmen and lawyers during the early
republic,433 the Native nations of North America were distinguished from
the “civilised empires” of the Incas and Aztecs.434  As Gregory Ablavsky has
shown, “Anglo-Americans readily adopted this habit of excluding their Native
neighbors from the ranks of the ‘civilized nations’”435 even as they sought
the United States’ full inclusion in the western league of nations.436  Native
nations, for their part, used the logic of the law of nations to argue for their
independent sovereignty.437
PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 136 (“[A]mong the responsible and respected public figures in
the first decades of United States development, there was a reasonable consensus that was
the underpinning of official policy toward the Indians.”).
429 See GUYATT, supra note 395, at 29.
430 SHEEHAN, supra note 413, at 101–05. See generally BILLINGTON, supra note 413; ROY
HARVEY PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN
MIND (1967).
431 FORD, supra note 68, at 14; see also L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF
NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD 4–63 (1989); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. ,THE AMERICAN INDIAN
IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 88–92 (1990); Gavin
Loughton, Calvin’s Case and the Origins of the Rule Governing ‘Conquest’ in English Law, 8
AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL HIST. 143, 175–76 (2004); Anthony Pagden, Dispossessing the Barbarian:
The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians,
in 20 THEORIES OF EMPIRE, 1450–1800, at 159, 159–78 (David Armitage ed., 1998).
432 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 81, at 129–30 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., 2008).
433 See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776–1814, at 11 (1993); see also Douglas J. Sylvester,
International Law as Sword or Shield?  Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 67 (1999).
434 VATTEL, supra note 432, § 81, at 129–30; see Ablavsky, supra note 30, at 607–08; see,
e.g., Deborah A. Rosen, Border Law: The First Seminole War and American Nationhood
131–33 (2015) (examining the use of this logic to justify the Seminole War).
435 Ablavsky, supra note 30, at 607.
436 Id. at 607–08.
437 Id. at 594.
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For some white Americans, these differences, previously based on relig-
ion, then on political organization, were also based on race.438  Some
believed Native Americans were racially inferior to whites.  Most elite whites,
though, believed them to be naturally equal to whites, but held back by an
inferior culture.  Thus the civilization program was intended, in part, to facil-
itate their assimilation into white society.
While the characterization of Native Americans as “savages” undoubtedly
fueled the government-missionary partnerships, the mission schools were lit-
tle different from any program of elementary education throughout the ante-
bellum period—including those funded by states and local governments.
Mission schools may have been, on the whole, more denominationally devout
than most government-funded schools,439  but states also funded denomina-
tional schools through the middle of the nineteenth century.440  And the
common schools, though not explicitly denominational, promoted a generic
form of Protestantism.441  By today’s standards, the government-missionary
partnerships may seem like efforts of “[c]ultural [g]enocide,”442 but they
reflected the standard Enlightenment view of human progress coupled with
uniquely American views of Christian republicanism and the natural equality
of Native peoples.443
VI. LESSONS FOR THE HISTORY OF DISESTABLISHMENT
Comprehending the federal-missionary partnerships as the result of an
elite white American social and political consensus about the demands of
education and republicanism sheds light on the development of nonestab-
lishment norms in the early republic and through the antebellum period.
A. The Scope of Objections to Governmental Funding of Religious Instruction
Most importantly, the partnerships clarify the scope of historical con-
cerns about religious assessments.  A number of scholars have suggested that
the opposition to assessments—especially Madisonian and Jeffersonian rhet-
oric—should be understood as the baseline from which nonestablishment
jurisprudence should proceed.444  For instance, Madison’s rhetoric against
438 See supra Section V.A.
439 See WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEES AND MISSIONARIES, 1789–1839, at 150
(1984) (noting that the Baptists and Methodists “brought to the Cherokees, as they did to
other areas of the frontier, a more democratic, informal version of Christianity than that of
the Moravians and the American Board”).
440 See supra notes 410–11.
441 See supra notes 410–11.
442 See GEORGE E. TINKER, MISSIONARY CONQUEST: THE GOSPEL AND NATIVE AMERICAN
CULTURAL GENOCIDE 8, 9 (1993) (arguing that it would not have been “culturally possible”
for missionaries who equated Christianity and civilization to see their mission as “[c]ultural
[g]enocide”).
443 See SHEEHAN, supra note 413, at 114.
444 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 21, at 745–46 (arguing that assessments are the
“paradigm case” of what the Establishment Clause was understood to forbid); Laycock,
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the Virginia assessments would support a broad prohibition on the govern-
ment’s “cognizance” of “Religion,”445 forced “support of any one
[E]stablishment,”446 and the “employ[ment] [of] Religion as an engine of
Civil policy.”447  Accordingly, some have concluded that “the broadly shared
eighteenth-century view” was “that it was wrong to coerce payment of taxes
for religious purposes.”448  The Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on
the assessment debates to claim in Everson v. Board of Education that “[n]o tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion.”449  Professor Laycock may be correct that the
Court’s asserted “absolutes were never true, not even in Everson itself,”450 but
the assessment controversy, viewed in isolation, seems to support it, as Justice
Sotomayor recently argued in her dissenting opinion in Trinity Lutheran.451
The government-missionary partnerships dramatically limit this reading
of the assessment controversy.  As Professor Laycock has recently argued, the
history of government-missionary partnerships “suggests—I do not say
proves—that the Founders were not concerned about money that went to
churches in pursuit of secular goals.”452  I think the partnerships suggest con-
siderably more than that.
Neither Madison nor Jefferson, to say nothing of the evangelicals who
actually drove the opposition to the Virginia assessments, had any problems
with the missionary partnerships.453  Acceptance was deep and widespread,
not only during the Founding, but through the Civil War.454
Laycock says that the constitutionally salient fact was that the partner-
ships were in pursuit of “secular goals.”455  That is half-right; it relies on an
anachronistic characterization of the partnerships.  Americans through the
antebellum period did not think in terms of “religious” versus “secular” “pur-
supra note 21, at 895 (“[T]he debates in Virginia were [the] most important” evidence of
“how the concept of establishment was understood in the Framers’ generation.”).
445 See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 24, at 299 (“Religion is wholly exempt from [Civil
Society’s] cognizance.”).
446 Id. at 300 (“[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever[.]”).
447 Id. at 301 (arguing that the notion that “the Civil Magistrate . . . may employ Relig-
ion as an engine of Civil policy” is “an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation”);
see also id. (“[T]he establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the
Christian Religion.”).
448 Feldman, supra note 21, at 418.
449 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
450 Laycock, supra note 7, at 138.
451 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2032–35 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
452 Laycock, supra note 7, at 144.
453 See supra Section III.C.
454 See supra Parts II & III.
455 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 144.
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poses” and “effects.”456  They did distinguish between revealed and natural
religion as two different topics (respectively, doctrine and morality).457  But
the idea of the secular as a disenchanted public sphere lay in the future.458
Understood in this context, the purposes and effects of the government-
missionary partnerships were neither purely “secular” nor purely “religious.”
The objective was “civilization,” understood as assimilation to a complex of
interrelated social norms, including agricultural development, liberalization
of property rights, and Christianization.459  Some government officials
praised religious instruction for its own sake, but this is also misleading; it was
never conceptually distinguishable from the broader motive of assimilation.
This clarifies the scope of the objections to religious assessments during
the early republic.  They were not directed at a vague notion of governmental
“support” of “religion” as the Court and many scholars have often claimed.
Laycock is closer to the mark when he says that the objections to assessments
were directed to “earmarked tax[es] to support the religious functions of
churches—most commonly the salaries of clergy, and sometimes also the
construction of church buildings.”460  But even this elides the similarities
between the partnerships and churches; both involved governmental funds
going to religious associations who used those funds to pay the salary of
ordained clergy members and construct buildings used for worship.
Since they did not provide an explanation, it is impossible to know
exactly why assessment opponents accepted the mission partnerships.  The
most straightforward explanation is that, for some reason, white Americans
perceived assessments to be a more direct imposition on conscience than
payments to missionaries.  This may have been because the money used for
missionaries was not raised from individual taxes designated for that purpose.
Indeed, the federal government imposed no direct taxes on individuals dur-
ing the early republic.  So all the funds spent on the missions were raised
from the sale of land, treaties, or use and ownership taxes.  Another explana-
tion may be the difference between tithes and benevolent giving within
Christian morality.461  Tithes are generally considered more mandatory, and
benevolent giving more discretionary.  Both, however, would have been
understood as governed by conscience.
In the end, these are speculations.  What is clear is that Madison and
others opposed assessments and accepted mission schools.  Assessments
threatened “the conviction and conscience of every man,” to ascertain “‘that
456 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
618–19 (1971).
457 See supra subsection V.B.2.
458 See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY
13, 23–24 (2003) (identifying “nineteenth-century romanticism” as the source of “dis-
enchantment” and the use of “secular” with mid-nineteenth-century English freethinkers
and social reformers).
459 See generally supra Parts I & II.
460 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 142.
461 See generally Mark Storslee, Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of dis-
charging it’”;462 government funding of religious instruction as part of a
comprehensive education did not.  This is why the movement to end relig-
ious assessments in Connecticut and Massachusetts in the early nineteenth
century had no connection—socially, politically, or conceptually—to subse-
quent debates in Massachusetts, New York, and elsewhere about “sectarian”
schooling.463
B. Do the Partnerships Support “Nonpreferentialism”?
This does not mean, however, that the government-missionary partner-
ships prove that Americans understood the Establishment Clause to permit
“nonpreferentialism.”  A number of scholars have argued that the early his-
tory, including the government-missionary partnerships, suggest that the
Founding generation believed the Establishment Clause permitted the gov-
ernment to support religion over nonreligion so long as it remained neutral
among religious groups.464  At one level, the partnerships clearly support this
position.  One of the purposes of the Civilization Fund program was to pro-
mote Christianity.  Virtually all of the funds went to Christian missionaries
who used them to engage in Christian instruction.  In this sense, the program
was not neutral between religion or nonreligion, nor even among “religions”
writ large—it was a form of Christian nonpreferentialism.
Yet this reading ignores two important facts.  The first is that the pro-
gram was formally neutral, not only among religions but between religion
and nonreligion.  No statute or regulation required an applicant for funds to
be Christian or even religious.  Given that many officials obviously under-
stood the program to promote the Christianization of Native people, this for-
malism is all the more important.  It suggests that officials were at least
concerned about the implications, whether political or legal, of formally
favoring religion.  Moreover, it suggests a tacit openness to allowing nonreli-
gious teachers to participate in the program.
Second, the view that the program should be understood to support a
nonpreferentialist construction of the Establishment Clause ignores the pro-
462 MADISON, supra note 24, at 299 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI
(1776)); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party
Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 908 (2019).
463 Compare 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 127, at 1043–50, 1189–1263 (discussing the end
of assessments in Connecticut and Massachusetts), with GREEN, supra note 253, at 69–71
(discussing the school wars).
464 As of 1997, Daniel Dreisbach counted more than a hundred books and articles dis-
puting the point. Cf. Dreisbach, supra note 14, at 24.  Leading proponents of “nonprefer-
entialism” include 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 592 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown, 2d ed. 1851); O’NEILL, supra note
16, at 9–10; Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 3, 14–15 (1949); CORD, supra note 16, at 112. See generally GERARD V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
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gram’s social context.  As discussed above, white Americans could not con-
ceive of education or assimilation into Western society that did not teach, at a
minimum, the natural religion of Christianity.  Furthermore, as a practical
matter the only groups available were Christian; there simply were no compa-
rable non-Christian educational associations in the antebellum period.465
Congress passed the Civilization Fund Act of 1819 during the early years of
the Second Great Awakening, when evangelical (and increasingly Catholic)
associations were mobilizing to combat a range of perceived social ills.466
The partnerships’ effective Christian nonpreferentialism reflected the (by
our standards narrow) religious pluralism of society at the time, not an
assumption about the scope of the Constitution.  The program’s distribution
of funds to virtually every existing Christian denomination is as consistent
with neutrality between religious and nonreligious education as it is with
Christian nonpreferentialism.
In fact, understood in historical context, the partnerships’ neutrality
illustrates the striking effect of disestablishment.  The colonial and revolu-
tionary partnerships were not neutral among Christian groups.  Anglican col-
onies favored Anglican missionaries, congregationalist colonies favored
Presbyterians, and no one (outside of perhaps Pennsylvania) trusted the paci-
fist denominations.467  The revolutionary Congress sponsored a Congrega-
tionalist missionary as a counterbalance to the Anglicans’ influence among
the Iroquois.468  From the Washington administration forward, the federal
government was more evenhanded.  Under the Civilization Fund Act, the
government even sponsored Catholic missionaries, something that would
have been unthinkable to the British colonists and likely would not have
passed political muster in many states.
What accounted for the uniformity of support for an initiative of such
religious diversity (measured by the standards of the day)?  Most likely a com-
mitment to nonestablishment, coupled with a unique social imaginary that
equated Christianity, in general, with social progress.  The Establishment
Clause prohibited favoring one Christian group over another.  Yet the diverse
Christian groups that increasingly fought over state funding for education
did not complain about the program’s relative religious pluralism.  Appar-
ently, within the emerging white American social imaginary, Christianity, of
any sort, was socially, politically, and religiously superior to non-Christianity
of any sort.  Put differently, white Americans appear to have been more toler-
ant of government support for denominational proselytization when the stu-
dents were “foreign,” “nonwhite,” or insufficiently “Christian” to start with.
For denominationalists, the price of the Establishment Clause was not a strict
prohibition on funding religious instruction, but rather the evenhanded
465 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 143–44 (“There were no [Founding-era] programs in
which government broadly funded some private activity that both churches and secular
organizations engaged in.”).
466 See supra Section I.E.
467 See supra Section I.A.
468 See supra Section II.C.
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funding of competing, sometimes mutually exclusive, Christian doctrines.  By
today’s standards of religious neutrality, the funding clearly favored Christi-
anity over other religions.  In historical context, though, the program was
strikingly neutral among disparate and competitive religious groups.
C. Voluntariness
Finally, the partnerships suggest that Americans through the antebellum
period believed that government-funded religious instruction should be, at
least as a formal legal matter, voluntary.  The Civilization Fund Act expressly
provided that the funds would be spent only on programs which garnered
the “consent” of Native peoples.469  During the antebellum period, Native
students were not legally obligated to attend federally funded schools upon
threat of punishment.470
Obviously, the quality of this consent must be understood in light of the
power differential between Native nations and the United States and the
backdrop of white efforts—usually states or settlers—to coerce Native peo-
ples out of their land and disparage their legal entitlements.  Yet the Native
nations considered themselves, and were viewed by the United States, to be
sovereigns capable of entering into treaties and therefore of meaningful,
legally binding consent.  Many of them negotiated for ongoing payments for
churches, clergy, or religious instruction.471  Likewise, at least some of them
actively sought mission schools funded by the “civilization” program.472  To
be sure, U.S. officials could be heavy-handed with efforts to incentive partici-
pation with the schools.473  This did not raise any constitutional eyebrows.
Such a formal notion of voluntariness would almost certainly not pass
muster under constitutional doctrine today.  At a minimum, the government
may not condition receipt of a valuable nonreligious public welfare benefit—
elementary education—on religious exercise.  Today this would constitute a
“substantial[ ] burden” on religious exercise under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, if not the Free Exercise Clause.474  To the extent a school
was effectively coercive because the parents felt obligated against their will to
send their children, it would also violate contemporary Establishment Clause
doctrine governing prayer and Bible reading in public schools.475  Even con-
469 Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 85, § 1, 3 Stat. 516, 516 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 271 (2018)); see supra Section II.B.
470 See supra Sections II.C–D.
471 See supra subsection I.D.2.
472 See supra Section II.A.
473 See supra subsection II.C.3.
474 See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018)
(adopting the “compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner”); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04, 409–10 (1963) (holding that a state violates the Free Exer-
cise Clause by denying unemployment benefits on the basis of religion).
475 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that a government-
sponsored nonsectarian prayer at a public middle school graduation ceremony violated the
Establishment Clause).
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sidering the schools as private religious institutions that were partially funded
by the federal government, the program may not have survived under the
Court’s funding doctrine.  Without giving parents any other schooling option
(such as one that valued and respected Native religions), the program was a
far cry from one of “true private choice.”476  In short, if the program were a
model for contemporary constitutional doctrine regarding voluntariness, it
would work a sea change in virtually all of the most important religious lib-
erty doctrines and permit an intolerable degree of coercion in matters of
religion.  Note, however, that these concerns were not unique to the federal-
missionary schools—they would have applied equally to many forms of gov-
ernment-funded elementary schooling in the antebellum era.
Yet, like the program’s “neutrality,” the degree to which it incorporated
a norm of consent, especially for a class of persons who were systematically
denied the full and equal rights of citizenship, is somewhat remarkable.  The
government may have committed itself to formal consent for diplomatic pur-
poses.  The policy was also consistent with the Protestant-inflected American
notion of liberty of conscience, which maintained that one must personally
accept religion for it to have any spiritual effect.  Yet as a whole there is little
to suggest that the partnerships were “sometimes little short of forcing the
Native Americans to choose between extermination and converting to Chris-
tianity.”477  Their commitment to formal legal consent reflected a develop-
ment in the history of religious liberty, though it would not satisfy modern
sensibilities.
Ultimately, consent is not the facet of the program that sheds the most
light on the historical development of nonestablishment norms.  What the
program illustrates is that the federal government had a longstanding and
widely accepted commitment to funding religious instruction as part of a for-
mal education.  Whatever the nature of parental consent, this alone clarifies
the boundaries of the historical objection to governmental funding of
religion.
VII. TRANSLATION
Since Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has relied heavily
on Founding-era history to construct Establishment Clause doctrine.478
More recently, though, its reliance on history in funding cases has waned.479
The current rationale for the Court’s funding doctrine is more a distillation
of precedent than an application of the historical understanding of nonest-
ablishment.480  In fact, it has been the dissenting Justices who have relied on
history to argue that the Establishment Clause prohibits the Court’s current
476 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
477 DRAKEMAN, supra note 144, at 334. R
478 See supra notes 7–13.
479 Compare, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653–54 (upholding a voucher program), with
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575–77, 591–92 (2014) (relying on Founding-
era history to uphold clergy-led prayer before town meeting).
480 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
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Free Exercise doctrine requiring evenhanded funding for religious organiza-
tions that provide some “secular” social goods.481
At the outset, it should be reemphasized that relying on the federal-mis-
sionary partnerships to shape contemporary constitutional doctrine requires
an “act of translation.”482  The partnerships were premised on a social imagi-
nary that has long splintered into competing views of social progress.  The
Court’s current approach to Establishment Clause doctrine rightly takes
account of the nation’s religious pluralism; as the Court declared two terms
ago, “[t]he Religion Clauses of the Constitution aim to foster a society in
which people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously.”483  Even a con-
textually sensitive account of the partnerships must acknowledge that, while
they were remarkably religiously pluralistic for their era, and many Native
Americans supported them, a similar program today would be unconstitu-
tional.  They were neutral neither among religions nor between religion and
nonreligion as contemporary doctrine rightly requires, nor were they pro-
grams of “true private choice”—Native American students had virtually no
other options for government-funded education.484  Historical practice may
inform constitutional construction without determining its contours.
With that important caveat, this Part wrestles with the best way to trans-
late the federal-missionary partnerships for contemporary law.  It begins with
a theoretical question: What should constitutional interpreters make of long-
standing governmental practice that did not generate constitutional reason-
ing, and therefore may not yield a clear constitutional principle?  It then
turns to briefly consider the possible implications of the partnerships for con-
stitutional doctrine and policy.
A. Uncontested Practice and Constitutional Construction
One challenge of translating the government-missionary partnerships
for constitutional law is to decide what the history is evidence of.  Since the
partnerships went virtually unopposed through the antebellum period and
were eventually terminated on policy grounds, they produced no contesta-
tion about the meaning or scope of the Establishment Clause.  Without
debate about the partnerships’ constitutionality, the historical material pro-
vides no express rationales that might animate, limit, or define a constitu-
tional principle.485
481 See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2284–86 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2032–35
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
482 See Lessig, supra note 35, at 1190.
483 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
484 For a recent case that arguably approximates the partnerships, see Americans United
for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 424–25
(8th Cir. 2007) (invalidating a state-funded residential program for prison inmates because
it was neither sufficiently religiously neutral nor one of true private choice).
485 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 36, at 362.
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Put differently, it is unclear how the practice should affect the contem-
porary construction of the Establishment Clause because it was not based on
an articulation of the Clause’s meaning.  Assume, for instance, that the Estab-
lishment Clause was originally “vague” with respect to governmental funding
of religion.486  The partnerships are not evidence of the “liquidat[ion],” or
clarification, of that provision.487  As conceived by James Madison, liquida-
tion of a constitutional provision requires evidence of the political commu-
nity’s “deliberate”488 resolution of a contested constitutional issue.489
“Legislative precedents,” he argued, were “entitled to little respect” “without
full examination & deliberation.”490  The federal-missionary partnerships’
constitutionality was barely mentioned, much less deliberated.
Moreover, the partnerships changed over time.  The early partnerships
were ad hoc; they could not have been entirely religiously neutral because
they were not open to all applicants.  Unlike the colonial governments, the
federal government did not favor an established denomination, but the prac-
tice was still not facially neutral.  The Civilization Fund program, by contrast,
was facially neutral and religiously diverse by the standards of the day, but it
did not begin until 1819—a generation after the enactment of the Establish-
ment Clause.  While some important figures in the early articulation of
nonestablishment norms apparently embraced the program, its neutrality
may not reflect the constitutional understanding of the constitutional draft-
ers or the ratifying public.491
There are, I think, at least three options for the contemporary salience
of the partnerships.  The first is that they amount to a “practice” that many
officials took to be constitutional.492  Jurists sometimes rely on practice, even
486 See supra Part V; see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional The-
ory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1122 n.22 (2015) (“If the communicative content is vague or
open textured, then the underdetermination is fixed and constitutional construction will
be required to fill in the legal content of constitutional doctrine.”).
487 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting James Madison,
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sep. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)); Baude, supra note 37, at 13–20; Nelson,
supra note 37, at 10–21; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 910, 940–41 (1985).
488 James Madison, Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 442, 443 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); James Madison, Let-
ter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (May, 1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra, at 478, 480.
489 Baude, supra note 37, at 16–18.
490 James Madison, To Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 317, 320 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson
& Anne Mandeville Colony, eds., 2013).
491 Most contemporary originalists focus on the original legal meaning or public under-
standing, not the drafters’ private intentions. See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE
LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO ORIGINALISM 16–17 (2017).  As Larry Solum has argued, in
most cases there may not be much difference. See Solum, supra note 486, at 1135.
492 See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43
(3d ed. 2017).
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when its constitutionality was not expressly articulated, as one “modality” of
constitutional construction.493  Doing so would be consistent with this tradi-
tion, but it would be unsatisfying as a tool for determining the original or
even later historical meaning of the constitutional text.
Another option is to view the partnerships as part of a “tradition” of
government-funded religious instruction in elementary schools.  Marc
DeGirolami has recently argued that jurists do, and should, rely on traditions
arising from longstanding community practice when determining constitu-
tional norms.494  Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly relied on a ver-
sion of this reasoning to uphold legislative prayers and certain government-
funded religious symbols.495  The main problem is that there is not an
unstinting practice of government-funded religious instruction—even when
viewed at the highest level of abstraction.  Widespread funding of private
religious schools ended with the Blaine Amendment movement of the late
nineteenth century,496 and public-school-led prayer and Bible reading have
been unconstitutional since 1962.497  Like resorts to “practice,” arguments
from “tradition” are unlikely to yield a constitutional principle that might
guide the constitutional evaluation of different practices.
Yet, precisely because they were taken for granted, the partnerships shed
light on the historical understanding of nonestablishment.  As discussed
above, they qualify the scope of the objections to assessments, illustrate the
extent of religious neutrality, and show a nascent, though incomplete, com-
mitment to voluntariness.  Concluding that an undisputed practice sheds less
light on the historical meaning of a constitutional provision than one that
generated controversy is somewhat perverse, elevating the constitutional sali-
ence of practices disputed by a handful of officials over those that were uni-
versally accepted, in this case over a long period of time.
What unreasoned practices cannot do, however, is suggest a clear princi-
ple.498  I suggest, therefore, that uncontested and long-standing practices,
like the partnerships, can support or undermine certain contemporary con-
structions of constitutional meaning, but they cannot dictate one.499  Put dif-
ferently, they can shed light on the historical understanding of a
constitutional provision, light that may help to approximate its original
meaning or a plausible contemporary construction, but they cannot be said
to have fixed any constitutional meaning in the past.  They are vulnerable to
493 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39–59
(1982).
494 See DeGirolami, supra note 36, at 1124 (arguing that longstanding practice is
uniquely normative for constitutional law).
495 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–792 (1983).
496 See supra Sections II.D–E.
497 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
498 See McConnell, supra note 36, at 362.
499 See Baude, supra note 37, at 25; Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, The Interpretation-Construc-
tion Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–02 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 67  8-DEC-20 9:34
2020] forgotten  federal-missionary  partnerships 743
contrary arguments, not only from text, but also from competing historical
practices, especially those based on express constitutional rationales.
For instance, if the Establishment Clause clearly forbade government
funding of schools that include religious instruction, the partnerships would
be evidence that the government violated the Constitution, not evidence that
officials believed them to be constitutional.  Likewise, if the government had
ended the partnerships because officials, after examination and deliberation,
concluded that they were unconstitutional, their prior, unreflective, exis-
tence should be entitled to less weight as evidence of the Constitution’s his-
torical meaning.
In this case, there is no contrary textual or historical evidence.  The
Establishment Clause was vague with respect to school funding.  And the
partnerships are consistent with state and local funding of religious instruc-
tion as part of a broader education throughout the antebellum era.  They
ended from lack of political support, not because Americans concluded that
the Establishment Clause prohibited them.  In fact, the contemporaneous
attempt to amend the Constitution to prohibit the funding of religious
schools strongly suggests that Americans believed the Establishment Clause
did not already prohibit such funding.
B. Contemporary Doctrine
1. The Principal Doctrine
The partnerships support the prevailing principle, articulated in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, that the Establishment Clause permits funding of relig-
iously neutral programs of “true private choice.”500  Under this principle, the
Court has upheld programs that provide school vouchers,501 tax deductions
for expenses related to private school (including tuition),502 and the exten-
sion of special health programs to students at private religious schools.503
Lower courts have extended the principle to funding of religious halfway
houses504 and AmeriCorp Education Awards for teachers in religious
schools.505  The partnerships provide historical support for the constitution-
ality of such programs.
2. The Direct/Indirect and Religious/Secular Distinctions
Contemporary doctrine is murkier when the government provides
money or educational materials (like books) directly to religious schools.  The
issue is whether the school uses the support for religious instruction.  The
500 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
501 Id. at 652.
502 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
503 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986).
504 Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2003).
505 Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 355 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
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Court has reasoned that when the government gives money or books directly
to parents, who then use them at religious schools, any religious instruction is
attributable to the parents.506  But the same is not necessarily true, Justices
O’Connor and Breyer maintained in a controlling opinion, when the govern-
ment provides money and books directly to schools—even if it does so on a
per capita basis.507  Likewise, they argued, direct support has a higher risk
that a reasonable observer would conclude that the government was endors-
ing religious instruction, raising another possible establishment concern.508
The Court has recently signaled a willingness to reconsider the bright
line between direct and indirect aid.  In Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause forbids a state from excluding a church from fund-
ing for a preschool playground simply because it is a church.509  The deci-
sion effectively means that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit such
funding.  The Court insisted, however, that its holding applied only to funds
for “playground resurfacing” and not to “religious uses of funding.”510  (Jus-
tice Breyer, without mentioning his prior reticence about direct funding,
joined the opinion of the Court.)511  So the current doctrine permits limited
direct funding of religious schools, but only for purely “secular” purposes,
and perhaps only for public goods related to the health and safety of
students.512
The history of the government-missionary partnerships supports this
doctrinal trajectory.  The program involved direct funding on a per capita
basis: the amount of funding was based on the number of students who vol-
untarily attended the schools.  The history would thus support extending the
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris doctrine to permit direct support so long as it is
neutral and based on the free decisions of parents and students.
The most difficult aspect of the partnerships to translate into contempo-
rary doctrine is due to the contemporary distinction between “religious” and
“secular” “uses of funding.”513  Despite being anachronistic and conceptually
problematic, the distinction between religious and secular purposes and
effects has a long pedigree in Establishment Clause doctrine and the Court is
unlikely to abandon it.
Nevertheless, the Court will eventually decide how strict the prohibition
on “religious uses” of government support ought to be.  The history of the
government partnerships provides support for a standard that takes account
506 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
507 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842–43 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487–88.
508 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842–43 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
509 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
510 Id. at 2024 n.3.
511 See id. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
512 See id.; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (“[C]utting off
church schools from” “general government services as ordinary police and fire protec-
tion . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.”).
513 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3.
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of the vagaries inherent in the conceptual distinction between secular and
religious: the support is constitutional when its ultimate aim is the provision
of a religiously neutral public good, a service that persons of any or no relig-
ion can recognize as valuable.  For most white Americans through the nine-
teenth century, education was inseparable from a modicum of religious
instruction.  By contemporary lights, that is no longer the case—most Ameri-
can education is now nonreligious, and even religious schools must ordina-
rily comply with religiously neutral academic standards.
The partnerships therefore undermine the argument in the dissenting
opinions in Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran that the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits support for public goods provided by religious groups.514  The history
neither supports nor undermines the Court’s ultimate conclusion in those
cases that the Free Exercise Clause requires states to extend such funding to
religious groups, but it does undermine resistance to that claim on the basis
of Madison and Jefferson’s objections to religious assessments.
3. Taxpayer Standing
The partnerships also call into question the Court’s longstanding excep-
tion to ordinary standing doctrine for Establishment Clause claims.  Ordina-
rily, being a taxpayer, alone, is insufficient for standing to challenge
governmental expenditures.515  Based in part on the history of religious
assessments, however, the Court has long maintained an exception for chal-
lenges under the Establishment Clause.516  Again, the state of the current
doctrine is somewhat unclear because the Justices cannot agree on a stan-
dard, but there is significant support for at least a modest exception for those
challenging legislatively determined expenditures.517  The Court has held,
though, that there is no standing to challenge a tax credit for private school
expenditures because “[w]hen the government declines to impose a tax . . .
there is no . . . connection between [the] dissenting taxpayer and alleged
establishment.”518  Even a case narrowing the exception thus relies on the
rationale that violating taxpayer conscience is a justiciable harm.
As the government-missionary partnerships narrow the scope of the
objections to religious assessments, they likewise narrow the scope of the his-
torical support for taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause.  The
history certainly supports the notion that there is a constitutionally cogniza-
ble harm in forcing taxpayers to pay tithes, even to their own churches; but
that history dissolves when applied to using general revenue to fund the pro-
vision of public services, even by religious organizations.  There may be pru-
514 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2284–86 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing); Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2032–35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
515 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480–89 (1923); see also Miller v. Cal.
Comm’n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 806
(1984).
516 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–06 (1968).
517 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 604–05 (2007).
518 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141–42 (2011).
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dential reasons to conclude that taxpayers should have standing to challenge
governmental support for religious instruction, but they are not rooted in
nonestablishment norms of the early republic.
4. Funding Foreign Religious Education
Finally, the history in this Article also sheds light on a contemporary
funding practice that has received far less attention from courts and scholars.
The Department of State occasionally funds foreign programs designed “to
promote a liberal and tolerant interpretation of Islam.”519  For instance, in
2004, the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan funded a local reform magazine
opposing illiberal interpretations of Islam, paid for twenty-five “mullahs” to
travel to the United States to attend a program called “Democracy and Civil
Society,” and provided funds “for restoration of the Mullah Mahmood
Mosque in Kabul.”520
Officials undoubtedly believe such expenditures promote important sec-
ular goods such as democracy and security—for Afghanis and Americans
alike.  Indeed, the State Department expenditures share much in common
with the nineteenth century partnerships.  They target one group of non-U.S.
citizens often considered to pose a national security threat for religious reed-
ucation.  Some may dismiss the program as a de minimis establishment viola-
tion521 or a case of foreign affairs exceptionalism522—as some dismiss the
nineteenth-century partnerships.523 Yet the partnerships support the consti-
tutionality of such programs.
Perhaps more importantly, the funding sheds light on the extent to
which the United States, for all its pluralism and commitment to religious
neutrality, continues to propagate a social imaginary of “civilization.”524
That social imaginary is more tolerant than it was in the nineteenth century,
but it is no less confident in its righteousness, humanitarianism, and
utility.525
CONCLUSION: OF POLITICS, EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
This Article has unearthed a forgotten aspect of federal governance that
bears directly on contemporary disputes about public policy and constitu-
tional law.  From the Founding through Reconstruction, the federal govern-
519 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, International Religious Freedom
Report 2004, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/
35513.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
520 Id.
521 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 861 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
522 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018).
523 See, e.g., DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 18, at 97–107; DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at
334–35.
524 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 40–48 (2011).
525 See id. at 192–98.
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ment partnered with missionaries to educate Native American students to
assimilate them into white American political culture.  Despite many constitu-
tional objections to religious assessments during the period, no one objected
to the partnerships.  The reason, this Article has argued, is that elite white
Americans took it for granted that civilization entailed education, and educa-
tion entailed instruction in Christianity.  The practice sheds light on the his-
torical development of nonestablishment norms and has important
implications for constitutional doctrine today.
Yet perhaps what is most sobering about the federal-missionary partner-
ships is not the way in which they reflect white America’s former chauvinism,
which is hardly surprising, but the way in which they lay bare the cultural,
political, and epistemological assumptions of any government-funded educa-
tional program.  The partnerships were consistent with a broader movement
to use elementary education to construct a distinctively American political
culture.  Although public education today must remain religiously neutral, it
is doubtful that any public educational regime could remain neutral with
respect to political norms.  Put differently, all public schooling is a matter of
civilizational construction; the questions are which civilization to construct,
how best to construct it, and which cultural and social costs to tolerate.
These questions still lurk under the surface of American disputes about
how to distribute public resources to promote one or another kind of school-
ing.  The details have changed, but public education’s role as a battleground
for cultural and political self-definition, and as a mechanism for social con-
trol, has not.  As William Faulkner wrote, “[t]he past is never dead.  It’s not
even past.”526
526 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 73 (2011) (1951).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 72  8-DEC-20 9:34
748 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
